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ABSTRACT
Since its passage in 1972, the majority of pollution reduction under the federal Clean Water Act
has resulted from technology-based limits imposed on point source dischargers. However, most
U.S. water bodies are unmonitored and of those that are, between 40 and 50 percent remain
impaired. Given this limited progress, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, multiple state
agencies, and non-governmental organizations have proposed water quality trading as a cost-
effective means to achieve pollution reductions from point and nonpoint sources. To determine
whether these programs actually achieve cost-effective pollution reduction in practice that they
promise in theory, I evaluate direct and indirect outcomes associated with three water quality
trading cases: the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program in California's San Joaquin
Valley; the Tar-Pamlico River Basin Nutrient Offset Program in North Carolina; and the Long
Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange in Connecticut.
Although reallocating reduction efforts through trades to achieve cost-effective solutions is
supposedly the major benefit of market-based instruments, only dischargers in the Long Island
Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange actively traded. The Grassland Area Farmers abandoned
trading in favor of a more affordable and heavily subsidized management strategy, and members
of the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association removed pollution onsite because reductions were less
costly than expected and uncertainty over Offset Program parameters impeded planning around
trades. Dischargers in the two cases also hesitated to trade because political transaction costs
that trading imposed on relationships among entities did not outweigh perceived savings.
Connecticut mitigated these costs and uncertainty by administering the Nitrogen Credit
Exchange. The major contributions of market-based instruments across cases were facilitating
dischargers' willingness to accept more stringent regulations and increasing the institutional
capacity for watershed management by encouraging formation of organizations along hydrologic
boundaries and information collection and dissemination. These benefits are attributable to the
decentralized governance structure in general rather than economic incentives specifically,
suggesting that policymakers should consider other decentralized approaches to watershed
management. If policymakers want dischargers to actively trade, they should design parameters
that mitigate uncertainty, market distortions, and political transaction costs. Even if trades never
occur, however, indirect outcomes associated with market-based instruments are significant
given the ongoing challenges to water quality improvement under the Clean Water Act.
Thesis Advisor: Lawrence E. Susskind
Title: Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning
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CHAPTER 1: FRAMING THE PROBLEM -
SUCCESSES AND ONGOING CHALLENGES OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
Water has filled an integral role in the development of the United States. Before the advent of
railroads and highways, rivers comprised major thoroughfares, and cities located along
prominent harbors and confluences. Early settlers and subsequent generations nourished
themselves with fish, and farmers used streams and diversions to irrigate crops. Water powered
the early stages of the industrial revolution. Water bodies also served as receptacles for human,
agricultural, and industrial waste. Over the centuries and particularly since the Industrial
Revolution, these uses have degraded water quality to the point that in many places native fish
no longer thrive and people cannot safely swim. Ohio's Cuyahoga River infamously ignited due
to oil and grease contamination and was declared a fire hazard in 1969 (Plater et al. 1998, 502).
In the watershed where I grew up, the Nashua River changed color daily based on dyes released
by paper factories. Worsening conditions and the groundswell of concern for the environment
led to governmental action to restore the nation's water resources.
In response to these conditions, Congress passed the 1972 Clean Water Act, which requires
states to adopt ambient water quality standards for surface water with the goal of restoring all
waters to fishable and swimmable conditions. In its early years, the Act primarily imposed
technology-based standards on pollutant dischargers, meaning that effluent limits are derived
from "Best Available Technology Economically Achievable." The National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES), the major Clean Water Act program, requires the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or approved states to issue permits to point source
dischargers based on "technology-based effluent limitations."' Congress did not initially call for
regulation of nonpoint sources because point sources were considered the primary cause of
impaired waters; nonpoint source regulation typically involves land-use controls, which
traditionally fall under local jurisdiction; and it is far more difficult to hold diffuse nonpoint
source dischargers accountable when the exact location and impact of pollution is unknown
(Plater et al. 1998, 501-2, 514).
Compliance with technology-based limits within NPDES permits was sufficient to restore some
water bodies to conditions safe for fishing and swimming; estimates suggest that 90 percent of
point source pollution has been removed since Clean Water Act passage (Plater et al. 1998, 501-
2). The Cuyahoga River is now an amenity in Cleveland's downtown. However, in areas with
concentrated point sources, incidence of previous contamination remaining in sediments and the
water column, or excess nonpoint source pollution from agriculture or stormwater runoff, waters
A point source is "any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance... from which pollutants are or may be
discharged. This term does not include agricultural stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated
agriculture" (33 U.S.C.A. § 502(14)). A nonpoint source is "any man-made source, discharging to surface waters,
that is not a point source. In general, a nonpoint source is a diffuse, intermittent source of pollutants that does not
discharge at a single location but whose pollutants are carried over or through the soil by way of stormflow
processes" (Plater et al. 1998, 513). States may administer NPDES programs if they receive approval from EPA,
although state programs remain subject to EPA review (33 U.S.C.A. § 510).
remain impaired even after point sources complied with technology-based limits (Plater et al.
1998, 501-2; Vergura et al. 2003, 51). Furthermore, NPDES does not impose limitations on
nonpoint sources lacking one discharger or location on which agencies can impose permits.
NPDES also exempts agricultural dischargers by designating them a category of nonpoint source
pollution despite agriculture being the most widespread source of water pollution in the U.S.
(Austin 2001, 340; Plater et al. 1998, 506-7).
EPA acknowledges that efforts under the Clean Water Act to restore the nation's waters have
been incomplete. First, most water bodies are not monitored for many chemical, physical, and
biological parameters (EPA 2003b). Second, of those that are monitored, 40 percent of rivers, 45
percent of streams, and 50 percent of lakes failed to meet water quality-based standards suitable
for their designated uses such as fishing and swimming as of 2003 (EPA 2004, 1). To address
these ongoing challenges, EPA began incorporating water-quality based standards in the late
1980s rather than relying primarily on technology-based limits. In addition, the agency
transitioned from point source-by-point source management to a more holistic, watershed-based
approach that considered the impact of all sources, including nonpoint sources, on water bodies
(EPA 2003b; Viessman and Hammer 2005, 14; Interview G-7).
The first step in pursuing this more holistic approach is to determine whether water bodies meet
quality-based standards. If so, states implement anti-degradation policies to maintain water
quality. If not, states place them on the 303(d) list for impaired waters. Next, states should
identify pollution sources and the amount of reductions necessary to achieve restoration goals
(EPA 2003b). Section 303 of the Clean Water Act establishes a Total Maximum Daily Load
(TMDL) as the maximum pollutant loading that a water body can assimilate without impairing
water quality beyond what is allowable under its designated use. Based on the TMDL analysis,
states distribute that load among point sources of pollution (known as the wasteload allocation),
nonpoint sources (known as the load allocation), and an additional margin of safety that ensures
discharges do not exceed the total pollution a water body can assimilate (Furtak 2006).
Together, the wasteload allocation, load allocation, and margin of safety essentially create a
pollution "cap."
EPA encourages states to implement a plan to achieve loading reductions necessary to meet
TMDL allocations. However, the Clean Water Act only requires the Agency to approve TMIDL
analyses; EPA does not enforce against states that fail to implement plans and achieve TMDL
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allocations (Plater et al. 1998, 534; Interview 0-2). Further, EPA requires states to incorporate
more stringent water quality-based limits consistent with the wasteload allocation into NPDES
permits if a TMDL analysis is complete (EPA 2003b; Interview O-2).3 Given the cost of such
limits, point sources are likely to delay or resist these changes. States have their choice of
additional policies and tools to achieve discharge reductions in compliance with the TMDL
2 TMDLs and water quality-based standards were largely ignored for the first couple decades after Clean Water Act
passage until many lawsuits against states and EPA forced agencies to define a TMDL completion schedule
(Feldman and Heinrich 2003, 256; Interviews L-5, 0-2).
3 Because allowable discharges depend on water quality rather than available technology, discharge targets under
TMDL plans are known as water quality-based standards, compared to the initially more prevalent technology-based
standards. This distinction means that even though a point source might use the Best Available Technology
Economically Achievable to reduce pollution, a NPDES permit can assign a stricter discharge limit to maintain
consistency with a completed TMDL analysis wasteload allocation.
analysis, and many have implemented voluntary programs that educate and provide incentives
for point and nonpoint sources to implement best management practices that reduce discharges.
In addition, some states have approved water quality trading programs in which point and
nonpoint dischargers in the same watershed voluntarily buy, sell, or offset the ability to discharge
pollution. In fact, TMDL analyses and the incorporation of more stringent, water quality-based
limits into NPDES permits are the driving force behind many water quality trading programs
nationwide since point sources often find it more affordable to pay others to reduce pollution
than to comply onsite (EPA 2004, 2).
To be effective, any management strategy that states adopt to achieve their TMDL goals must
incorporate political viewpoints, environmental concerns, economic realities, legal authority, and
technical and physical parameters within an area that often does not coincide with political
boundaries (Viessman and Hammer 2005, 6). However, because of point sources' resistance to
more stringent water quality-based standards, agricultural exemptions, financial barriers to
pollution reduction upgrades, difficulties making nonpoint sources accountable for meeting their
load allocation, lack of information on the sources and impacts of pollution, and challenges
coordinating management strategies on a watershed scale, much pollution continues to enter and
impair waterways despite increasing reliance on water quality-based standards. In this
regulatory environment, water quality trading presents a way to engage sources and persuade
them to reduce discharges by allowing them to profit from credits that others pay to offset their
own discharges. In theory, water quality improvements that would not otherwise occur become
feasible due to gains in cost-effectiveness which allow sources to maximize the amount of
pollution reduction possible with available resources. This ability is particularly relevant for
publicly-owned sewage treatment plants that face an ongoing struggle to secure public funds to
upgrade aging infrastructure. EPA recognizes that trading might not be the most effective or
appropriate tool in all watersheds or for all pollutants, however (EPA 2004, 2-3; Interview 0-2).
Because of the theoretical benefits of market-based instruments, multiple states and local
governments have established water quality trading programs as part of broader watershed
strategies to more cost-effectively reduce pollution loads entering and impairing waterways. To
determine whether this tool has effectively advanced its objectives and yield lessons for
policymakers considering various implementation plans in other watersheds, my thesis asks:
"How and to what extent do market-based instruments in practice achieve the
outcomes that they promise in theory?"
I analyze three cases that adopted water quality trading at least five years ago and claim to have
reached their pollution reduction goals in the majority of years: the Grassland Area Farmers
Tradable Loads Program in California's San Joaquin Valley; the Tar-Pamlico River Basin
Nutrient Offset Program in North Carolina; and the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit
Exchange in Connecticut (see Exhibit 1-1). I selected cases in existence for at least five years so
that I could assess direct and indirect outcomes including whether trades occurred, changes in
pollution discharges, and any unexpected results. Although one source suggests that as many as
70 market-based instruments have been implemented, piloted, or proposed (Kieser and Fang
2005), I identified just 14 major programs that began in the U.S. before early 2002 (EPA 1999;
Fang and Easter, 2003; Breetz et al., 2004; Hahn, 1989; Kieser and Fang, 2005).4 Therefore, my
analysis provides an in-depth examination of more than 20 percent of these older programs.
Exhibit 1-1
| Source: Environmental Trading Network (2007)
I argue that market-based instruments can only achieve their goal of improving cost-
effectiveness if dischargers actually trade to reallocate pollution reduction efforts. This intended
outcome does not consistently occur, but the implementation of trading programs can yield
additional benefits. To support this argument, I assess factors that preceded the programs, either
encouraged or deterred trading, and contributed to other outcomes that could indirectly advance
water quality improvement goals. By analyzing three cases, I identify similarities in the tool's
benefits and limitations.
Compared to research on the use of market-based instruments to manage air emissions, relatively
little exists on water quality trading. Further, much of the literature covering multiple programs
are surveys rather than case study analyses and tend to focus on program design and trading
activity. This thesis contributes an in-depth analysis across three cases that explores the
unexpected outcomes associated with market-based instruments in addition to trading activity
and cost-effectiveness, including dischargers' willingness to comply with more stringent
4 In addition to the three cases evaluated in this thesis, the programs are: Boulder Creek, Cherry Creek, and Dillon
Reservoir in Colorado; Piasa Creek Watershed in Illinois; Kalamazoo River in Michigan; Rahr Malting Company
and Southern Minnesota Beet Sugar Cooperative in Minnesota; Passaic Valley Sewerage Commission Pretreatment
Program in New Jersey; New York City Watershed Pilot Offset Program; and Fox River and Red Cedar River in
Wisconsin (EPA 1999; Fang and Easter 2003; Breetz et al. 2004; Hahn 1989; Kieser and Fang 2005).
regulations, improved dynamics among stakeholders, formation of organizations along
watershed boundaries, and greater collection, dissemination, and use of information.
This contribution is important because the ongoing challenges to continued water quality
improvements under the Clean Water Act are not only the result of limited resources for
pollution upgrades. On the contrary, progress has also been impeded by difficulties getting point
and nonpoint sources to accept more stringent, water quality-based standards, incomplete
information on pollution sources and impacts, and lack of institutional capacity to manage
resources on a watershed scale. I argue throughout this thesis that the primary contribution of
market-based instruments is not the ability to redistribute abatement efforts in order to achieve
more cost-effective pollution reduction with finite resources. Rather, the major benefit of water
quality trading is its ability to facilitate more stringent and unprecedented regulations and
increase the institutional capacity for watershed management.
I develop and evaluate this argument as follows. Chapter 2 summarizes how water quality
trading should achieve cost-effective outcomes in theory and outlines the accepted, necessary
conditions for market-based instruments to function. I also present my methods for conducting
this case study analysis. Chapter 3 places the background and design of the three programs in
context in order to understand the significance of the findings in the remaining chapters. Chapter
4 analyzes why dischargers did not actively trade and thus reallocate pollution reduction efforts
to achieve cost-effective outcomes in two of the cases but did in the third. In Chapter 5, I
provide evidence that trading activity is not necessary to meet pollution reduction objectives. I
also evaluate the unexpected contributions of trading to increasing the capacity to regulate and
manage pollution on a watershed scale. In addition, I discuss whether program adaptability
increased with the option to trade. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes with the major lessons from
these cases and the broader implications for water quality planning.
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CHAPTER 2: THE PROMISE AND PRACTICE OF POLLUTION TRADING
Although they have existed for decades, market-based instruments in general and pollution
trading specifically are receiving growing interest as an efficient, effective, and affordable
regulatory tool (Tietenberg 2007, 63; Ellerman 2007, 48; Rothenberg 2005, 220). Public
attention has become particularly high in recent months as politicians debate ways to combat
climate change; almost daily, newspaper editorials call for economic incentives to reduce carbon
emissions (Leonhardt 2007).5 The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) also recognizes
the potential for leveraging market forces to improve and protect the nation's water resources; it
issued a Water Quality Trading Policy in 2003, a Water Quality Trading Assessment Handbook
in 2004, and is in the final stages of preparing a water quality trading guide for permit writers
(EPA 2003a, 2004; Interviews L, 0-1, 0-2).
Before assessing how trading programs function in practice, I review why they should create
cost-effective outcomes in theory. I note prominent trading "successes" that inspired
policymakers in the three cases to explore market-based instruments. I next identify necessary
conditions for a trading system to function and conclude by describing how I conducted this case
study analysis.
The Mechanics of Trading
The foundational principle of environmental economics is that some pollution is efficient, but too
much causes excess damage while too little unnecessarily precludes other beneficial activities
(Kolstad 2000, 101). As a simple example, emissions from power plants incrementally harm
human health, but the ability to pollute reduces production costs. If power plants operated at full
capacity without abating emissions, the damage to health would exceed savings that plants derive
from the ability to pollute. However, if power plants ceased emitting to prevent any human harm
from emissions, production costs would be prohibitive, resulting in too little electricity. A
balance exists where the marginal savings that plants gain from the ability to pollute equals the
marginal damage imposed on others; this is the efficient level of pollution (Kolstad 2000, 148).
Often plants have different abatement costs and increasing marginal reduction costs, meaning it
costs plants more per ton of pollution reduction the more that they reduce. If the government
wants to limit the amount of pollution that plants emit to the efficient level, it could require all
plants to reduce by the same amount (hypothetically, 10 tons) and impose costs on all plants.
However, plants with higher abatement costs could save money by paying a plant with lower
abatement costs to pollute less; thus the higher cost plant could reduces 8 tons while the lower
cost plant reduces 12 tons. The plants can continue to decrease total abatement costs by paying
the lower cost plant to reduce more until eventually marginal reduction costs at the two plants are
5 In a March 28 New York Times column entitled "Earth's Climate Needs the Help of Incentives," David Leonhardt
argued that a cap and trade system for carbon could generate similar successes as it had in restoring fisheries and
reducing acid rain-causing sulfur dioxide emissions (Leonhardt 2007).
equal. This cost-effective point occurs where no discharger can save money by paying another to
reduce for less; the least-cost solution has been achieved (Kolstad 2000, 148).
Adding another level of complexity to pollution management, identical amounts of emissions
from plants in two different locations often do not have the same impact on ambient pollution
levels or a particularly sensitive receptor. For example, if two identical power plants in different
locations emit sulfur dioxide that creates acid rain damaging to forests, the plant closer to the
forest could create twice the amount of acid deposition in the forest per unit of emissions as the
plant that is further away; its equivalency factor is twice as high.7 If the agency knows the fate
and transport of emissions and their effect on ambient pollution levels at the receptor, it can
assign an ambient pollution limit rather an emissions limit. After normalizing emissions by their
equivalency factor, the cost-effective solution occurs where plants equalize the amount that they
spend to decrease the marginal damage to the forest (Kolstad 2000, 157).
These increasing complexities illustrate the tradeoffs that regulators face between efficiency and
simplicity, particularly when they lack complete information. One compromise is a zonal fee
system that incorporates the impact of location more simply than an ambient system but more
accurately than an emissions system. Rather than assigning each discharger a unique
equivalency factor, the regulator divides the jurisdiction into zones and assigns each zone a
factor (Kolstad 2000, 163).
Given that polluters typically have better knowledge of their operations and costs than regulators,
agencies should more easily achieve least-cost solutions by implementing regulatory tools that
grant polluters flexibility to decide how to reduce (Kolstad 2000, 180). The agency can employ
market-based instruments to achieve this goal; I describe the three used in my case studies. First,
it can institute a cap and trade system in which polluters are left on their own to identify each
other, bargain, and trade pollution loads until they equalize marginal reduction costs. The cap
provides certainty regarding the quantity of pollution reduced, but the price is less certain and
depends on polluters' marginal reduction costs (Kolstad 2000, 184).
Second, if the agency knows the marginal cost of reducing from another source, such as the cost
of reducing one pound of carbon by generating electricity from a wind turbine rather than a coal-
fired power plant, it can offer polluters the option to offset their emissions at this rate. Under the
offset system, a polluter chooses to either reduce its emissions by a specified amount or purchase
credits, usually from a clearinghouse. This system increases certainty regarding pollution
abatement costs; marginal abatement costs should not exceed the offset rate because the rational
polluter will purchase credits if its costs are greater than the credit price. The agency must
ensure that offsets actually fund reductions additional to any reductions that would have
otherwise occurred in order for the offset system to reduce a specific quantity of pollution.
Otherwise, the offset functions as a tax that somewhat deters emissions. In summary, offsets
6 For the purpose of this thesis, I do not evaluate the efficiency of trading programs. Other than mentioning any
concerns about pollution reduction targets that stakeholders voiced, I do not question the cap imposed by the
regulatory agency. Rather, I evaluate whether trading programs enable dischargers to pursue the most cost-effective
solution to achieving pollution reductions by engaging in trades to redistribute reduction efforts. I also discuss non-
market costs and benefits that address other challenges to continued water quality improvements.
7 Equivalency factors are also known as transfer coefficients.
have medium quantity certainty but high price certainty (Kolstad 2000, 184). Further, the
clearinghouse lowers transaction costs associated with uncertainty, search, and bargaining.
The third tool is a hybrid of the cap and trade and offset systems. Known as a credit exchange,
the agency sets a cap on all polluters and assigns them individual reduction targets. The agency
also establishes a clearinghouse and sets a credit value. If the discharger does not reduce
enough, it can purchase credits similar to the offset system. If the polluter reduces more than
necessary, it can sell credits to the exchange. Thus the polluter has more incentive to reduce
pollution than under the offset system because reducing more than necessary avoids costs and
generates revenue. However, unlike the offset system, payments that the clearinghouse receives
for credit purchases do not necessarily induce similar reductions elsewhere; the credit exchange
does not guarantee that it is revenue neutral, meaning that credit sales equal purchases. As a
result, the credit exchange only has medium certainty regarding the quantity of reduction but
high certainty regarding the price. Again, the clearinghouse lowers transaction costs associated
with uncertainty, search, and bargaining. Table 2-1 summarizes these tools.
Table 2-1
THREE MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS TO ENCOURAGE COST-EFFECTIVENESS
Certainty of Reduction Transaction Costs:
Quantity Price Search and Bargaining a
Cap and Trade High Certainty Low Certainty Potentially High
Offset Program Medium Certainty High Certainty Low
Credit Exchange Medium Certainty High Certainty Low
a Transaction costs associated with search and bargaining are likely to vary by choice of market-
based instruments. I discuss other types of transaction costs later in this chapter.
Theoretical Advantages of Market-Based Instruments Over Prescriptive Regulations
Ellerman (2007, 49) explains that both traditional regulations and market-based instruments
involve "command" by an agency; the distinction is the level at which the command occurs.
Prescriptive regulations specify particular limits at each source of pollution, whereas market-
based regulations only specify the aggregate limit among a group of sources in a particular
region. Under the decentralized, market-based approach, dischargers maintain autonomy to
decide how they want to meet production limits.
The sulfur dioxide cap and trade system established under the 1990 Clean Air Act amendments
was one of this country's first major experiments with market-based instruments and
demonstrates several advantages that market-based instruments might yield over prescriptive
regulations. Known more commonly as the Acid Rain Program, Congress established and
distributed tradable emissions rights as a way to achieve 50 percent reductions in sulfur dioxide
emissions (Ellerman 2007, 52; Kolstad 2000, 21). Many stakeholders that I interviewed cited it
as one of the reasons they chose to explore pollution trading in their watershed.
Market-based instruments are touted as having many advantages over traditional prescriptive
regulations. First, they should save money by allowing dischargers to identify the least-cost
method to achieve necessary reductions. Under the Acid Rain Program, the price per ton of
sulfur dioxide dropped from over $500 to $65, suggesting major decreases in abatement costs
(Kolstad 2000, 21).8 Second, economic incentives can be designed to achieve objectives faster
by encouraging early over-compliance (Leonhardt 2007). Cap and trade and credit exchange
systems encourage more rapid reductions by providing polluters the opportunity to earn revenue
for their efforts. Along with offset programs, they also induce early compliance by allowing
dischargers to avoid the costs of purchasing the right to pollute. The Acid Rain Program realized
almost fifty percent decreases in just the fifth year of implementation because it allowed
polluters to voluntarily bank credits (Ellerman 2007, 50). The final major benefit that
proponents tout is the ability of market-based instruments to encourage innovation in compliance
mechanisms by creating value in the ability to reduce pollution more than necessary. Advances
in scrubber technology and increased availability of low sulfur coal could arguably be
attributable to the Acid Rain Program (Tietenberg 2007, 67).
EPA notes that trading may yield additional improvements in water quality, such as engaging
less-regulated nonpoint sources in improving water quality through offset programs and
generating ancillary benefits by reducing other threats to water quality as well as the pollutant
being traded (EPA 2004, 1). The Clean Water Services Model Trade in Oregon's Tualatin
Watershed illustrates these benefits. In 2001, the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
completed a temperature TMDL for the Tualatin River that required Clean Water Services, a
sewer agency, to reduce its effluent's temperature by 95 percent in order to protect endangered
salmon (ODEQ 2006, 12). Clean Water Services estimated that refrigeration would require an
upfront investment of $60 to $150 million and annual operating costs of $2.5 to $6 million.
Recognizing that the majority of temperature increases resulted from degraded riparian buffers
upstream, the sewer agency proposed offsetting its temperature impact by paying farmers
through the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Conservation Reserve Enhancement Program to
restore vegetation and shade riparian corridors. This restoration should yield ancillary erosion
and habitat benefits (Biom-Hansen 2004; ODEQ 2006, 12; Interviews G, I). Although too early
to evaluate outcomes since its 2005 implementation, the program demonstrates the additional
benefits that water quality trading could achieve. Finally, EPA notes that trading can facilitate
watershed management by increasing communication among stakeholders within a basin (EPA
2004, 1).
Necessary Conditions for Trading to Occur
Rothenberg (2005, 220) explains that while market-based instruments provide many
opportunities, they also require careful design to function properly and avoid unintended
consequences. In its Water Quality Trading Policy and Water Quality Trading Assessment
Handbook, EPA outlines the following conditions that should exist to support a viable market-
based instrument:
e Regulatory Driver: Without regulation, pollution abatement has little value to
dischargers. The value comes from avoiding compliance costs or penalties
imposed by a regulatory agency. For a trading system to function, explicit
compliance and enforcement mechanisms must back up these regulations;
8 An alternative interpretation is that industry overstated compliance costs.
e Suitable Pollutant with Reliable Units of Trade: The exchange of pollution
loads between two parties should not harm a third party (Easter et al. 1997, 604).
Therefore, EPA prefers trades of nutrients (nitrogen and phosphorous) and
sediments that are not sensitive to short-term loadings or prone to creating
localized problems known as "hotspots." EPA prefers prescriptive regulations
with tighter controls for persistent bioaccumulative toxics that pose a greater risk
to human health and have impacts more sensitive to temporary load fluxes.
Suitable pollutants should be traded as distinct units, and any credits purchased
should generate pollution reductions before or during the period in which they
serve as a compliance mechanism;
" Difference in Marginal Costs That Exceeds Transaction Costs: Savings
associated with trading must surpass the resources that dischargers expend in
order for trades to be worthwhile. Conditions that increase transaction costs are
described below;
e Willingness to Participate and Provide Input: A variety of watershed
stakeholders should participate in the design of the program and the public should
have access to information to increase the program's credibility; and
e Adaptability: Agencies should conduct periodic evaluations accessible to the
public that review whether trades advance water quality objectives, incorporate
new or changing information, assess and if necessary adjust pricing mechanisms,
and address any other concerns (EPA 2003a, 8-11; EPA 2004, 2; Easter et al.
1997, 604; Scholz and Stiftel 2005, 234).
In addition, Kolstad (2000) adds that a functional market requires:
* Dischargers Responsive to Price Signals: In order for a market to yield cost-
effective outcomes, dischargers must realize the full costs and benefits of their
management decisions. Incentives and penalties must affect those with the ability
to change pollution levels. Trading is less effective in sectors that are heavily
subsidized or have softer budget constraints (Kolstad 2000, 150).
Stavins (1995) identifies three sources of transaction costs that can prohibit trades: search and
information costs; bargaining and decision-making costs; and monitoring and enforcement costs.
These costs can be exacerbated by:
e Insufficient Information: Adequate information is a critical component of any
market (Israel 2002, 245). Dischargers must know their marginal abatement
costs in order to determine at what price it becomes advantageous -to trade
allocations or offset loads rather than reduce pollution onsite. They must also
have enough information to estimate present and future credit or load prices.
Finally, entities must be able to ascertain that purchased credits are legitimate in
order to trust trading as a compliance mechanism that can be incorporated into
their planning process; the government can play an important role in establishing
this credibility (Israel 2002, 245). If these conditions do not exist, transaction
costs will become excessively high; and
e Market Thinness: A small number of trading partners creates a condition of
market thinness in which participants cannot easily identify advantageous trades.
Fewer transactions make it harder for dischargers to equalize marginal abatement
costs and achieve cost-effective outcomes (Kolstad 2000, 170).
Method
To evaluate whether market-based instruments actually achieved theorized gains in cost-
effectiveness, observe how programs dealt with obstacles to trading, and identify any common
unexpected outcomes, I conducted a qualitative assessment of market effectiveness for three
cases: the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program; the Tar-Pamlico Basin Nutrient
Offset Program; and the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange. As Tietenberg explains,
a market-effectiveness evaluation assesses whether the programs' structure allowed a market to
emerge that resulted in cost-effective reallocations of pollution or if transaction costs and other
limitations prevented exchanges from even occurring. Similar to Wossink (2004) and Young
(2004), I relied on interview responses and documented evidence rather than quantitatively
modeling transaction costs and exchanges (Tietenberg 2007, 65, 89).
For each case, I examined publicly available and internal documents from regulatory agencies
and regulated entities, including enabling legislation, agreements, and bylaws; annual reports;
monitoring information; and budget data. I also reviewed third party sources such as journals,
reports, and newspaper articles that described conditions in the watershed or the trading program
specifically. Finally, I interviewed state and federal agency staff, regulated dischargers and their
consultants, and environmental groups. I also spoke with a range of individuals involved in
some aspect of watershed management who could broadly assess water quality-based regulations
and trading programs. Table 2-2 summarizes the interviews that I conducted both in person and
over the phone between November 2006 and March 2007, and Appendix 1 lists these individuals
and describes my interview protocol.
Table 2-2
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS
Federal State Regulated Environmental Total
Agency Agency Entity Organization
Grassland Area Farmers 4 4 7 1 16
Tradable Loads Program
Tar-Pamlico River Basin 0 4 2 4 10
Nutrient Offset Program
Long Island Sound 4 2 2 0 8
Nitrogen Credit
Exchange
Other 10 1 0 2 13
Total 18 11 11 7 47
Summary
Water quality trading offers many potential benefits because of its theoretical ability to maximize
a regulation's cost-effectiveness. However, multiple conditions are necessary for the tool to
succeed, and some factors inherent to water quality management such as pollution fate and
transport and market thinness may limit this promising tool's practical benefits. To determine
whether water quality trading contributes to pollution reduction by reallocating loads to increase
the impact of abatement efforts or by realizing other indirect, ancillary benefits, I evaluate
different market-based instruments in California, North Carolina, and Connecticut.
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CHAPTER 3: PLACING TRADING PROGRAMS IN CONTEXT
Tietenberg (2007, 64, 66) explains that no program evaluation is complete without considering
context and relationship to existing regulations and complementary policies. Therefore, I present
the environmental problems, political dynamics, and existing institutions that precipitated each
trading program and describe the program design process. I include details relevant to
discussions in Chapters 4 through 6 on why active trades only occurred in one out of three
programs and the significance of the tool's unintended contributions to increased pollution
regulation and management on a watershed scale.
Controlling Selenium in the San Joaquin Valley
The potent and deadly effects of selenium grabbed national attention in 1983 when U.S. Fish and
Wildlife Service biologists discovered abnormal numbers of severely deformed and dead baby
birds in the San Luis National Wildlife Refuge's Kesterson Reservoir (Harris 1991; Fisher-
Vanden et al. 2004). The "Kesterson Disaster," as it was called, resulted when irrigation water
leached the naturally occurring trace element selenium from soils into subsurface drains designed
to prevent water-logging and salinization in farms along the western flank of California's San
Joaquin Valley.9 The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (the Bureau) began the San Luis Drain in
1968 to transport drainage water from Westlands Water District in Fresno County northwest to
the San Francisco Bay Delta. Funding, political complications, and environmental concerns
halted Drain construction in 1975, and water stopped abruptly in Kesterson after 85 miles (San
Joaquin River Exchange Contractors Water Authority et al. 2003, 9; Young and Congdon 1994;
Interview G-5).
Kesterson constituted a 1,200 acre reservoir in the midst of 60,000 acres of existing duck clubs
and state and federal wildlife refuges (Interviews G-5, G-8). At first clubs welcomed the
drainage water to supply the various wetlands and reservoir; the effects of selenium were not
well-known or publicized. Lacking an outlet, however, selenium concentrated and
bioaccumulated up the food chain until 1983 when 20 percent of nests contained deformed birds
and over 40 percent had at least one dead embryo. Only one fish species remained (Young and
Congdon 1994, 9).
Kesterson's consequences were drastic and long-lasting. The Bureau closed the San Luis Drain
in 1986, converted the reservoir to upland habitat, and ripped subsurface drains out of lands
within Westlands Water District (California Regional Water Quality Control Board 2001, 3;
Interview G-5). Yet the same level of agriculture was not possible since salinization and water-
logging threatened productivity.
9 This portion of the Valley is highly dependent on irrigation as it receives less than ten inches of precipitation
annually (Austin 2001, 344).
Located between the massive Westlands Water District, Kesterson, and other wetland refuges,
seven districts totaling approximately 97,000 acres in the Grassland Basin also relied on drains.
They ranged from 840 to 42,300 acres, and land within them produced primarily cotton, melons,
vegetables, alfalfa, grains, grapes, and orchard fruit (San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water
Authority 1996; Austin 2001, 344).10 Their drainage flowed into channels that initially delivered
a mix of "hot" and "fresh" water to other wetland refuges before the Kesterson Disaster.'" After
the discovery of wildlife mortalities, channels flipped between conduits of fresh water for the
wetlands and drainage water that passed en route to the San Joaquin River. The 1992 Central
Valley Project Improvement Act increased fresh water allocations to the refuges, and the "flip-
flop" system restricted delivery of this preferable supply (Austin 2001; Interviews G-1, G-5).
Given the outcry over selenium's deadly effects on wildlife and the increased availability of
fresh water, district managers and farmers in the Grassland Area saw mounting pressure to
prohibit selenium-laden drain water from passing through channels and reduce selenium loads by
regulating drainage. Realizing that productivity would decrease without drainage, the seven
districts began negotiations in 1988 with San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water Authority (the
Water Authority), the Bureau, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, EPA, Environmental Defense,
and downstream Contra Costa County and Contra Costa Water District over use of 28 miles of
the San Luis Drain to bypass water around the wetland channels into Mud Slough eight miles
upstream of its confluence with the San Joaquin River (San Joaquin River Exchange Contractors
Water Authority 2003, 9; Grasslands Area Farmers 2006; Interviews G-1, G-4, G-8, G-12). The
proposition was controversial, with many concerned that it was reviving Kesterson's "killer
drain" (Interviews G-1, G-8). The seven districts formed the Grassland Area Farmers in 1995 as
a regional drainage entity within the Water Authority in order to enter into an agreement with the
Bureau (see Exhibit 3-1) (Interview G-4, Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004; USBR 2005).13 The Bureau
and Water Authority on behalf of the Grassland Area Farmers signed the Agreement for the Use
of the San Luis Drain (known as the Use Agreement) in November 1995, commencing the
Grassland Bypass Project. The Use Agreement contained two components critical for a tradable
loads program: 1) the Bureau's condition that selenium discharges from the region to the San
Joaquin River stay below monthly and annual limits; and 2) granting the Grassland Area Farmers
the right to design their own management system to achieve these regional limits. The Bureau
monitors selenium loads coming from the Grassland Area at Site B in the San Luis Drain just
upstream of its confluence with Mud Slough.
10 In 2003, the crop market value from the area's agricultural production approximately equaled $113 million, which
generated an additional $126 million for the local and regional economies. Together, the area has an economic
value of roughly $239 million (San Joaquin River Exchange Contractors Water Authority et al. 2003, 6).
" No drainage from the seven districts was ever delivered to Kesterson Reservoir.
1 The San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water Authority is a Joint Powers Agreement comprised of 32 water districts
with federal contracts to receive water from the Central Valley Project. Under California law, two or more
governmental agencies (in this case, water and drainage districts) with a common interest may form a Joint Powers
Agreement. Districts formed the Water Authority in order to assume operations and maintenance responsibilities
from the Bureau for the federal infrastructure that conveyed water to them. The Grassland Area Farmers formed as
an Activity Agreement within the Water Authority (Interview G-4).
13 The seven districts are: Broadview Water District; Firebaugh Canal Water District; Pacheco Water District;
Panoche Drainage District; Charleston Drainage District; Widren Water District; and Camp 13 Drainage District.
Exhibit 3-1
GRASSLAND BYPASS PROJECT
I Source: Adapted from Grassland Bypass Project Oversight Committee (2003)
Administered by an Oversight Committee composed of senior staff from the Bureau, U.S. Fish
and Wildlife Service, California Department of Fish and Game, Central Valley Regional Water
Quality Control Board, and EPA, the Use Agreement set clear enforcement and accountability
conditions. It could terminate drain access if discharges exceeded 120 percent of the regional
selenium load limit or created "unacceptable adverse environmental effects" (Young and
Karkoski 2000, 157; Austin 2001, 350). The Grassland Area Farmers, governed by the
Grassland Basin Drainage Steering Committee composed of representatives from each district,
paid incentive fees for lesser exceedances (Austin 2001, 351). 1,5
14 Under "unforeseeable or uncontrollable conditions," the Use Agreement grants the Oversight Committee the
authority to waive incentive fees or termination of the Grassland Bypass Project (Young and Karkoski 2000, 157).
The selenium limits took effect in 1997, and in the first two years the goal was for discharges to
remain constant compared to historical average of 6,660 pounds per year. The load limit has
since decreased until reaching its wet year limit of 3,087 pounds in 2005. The critical dry year
limit will continue to decrease until it reaches 1,001 pounds in 2010 (Young and Karkoski 2000,
157; San Francisco Estuary Institute 2007; Interviews G-1 and G-2).16, 17 These final limits are
consistent with the Total Maximum Monthly Load that the Central Valley Regional Water
Quality Control Board completed in 2001.
Unlike elsewhere in the U.S., California Regional Water Quality Control Boards have the
authority to regulate and issue waste discharge requirements to both point and nonpoint sources,
including agriculture. The Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board issued a Phase
I waste discharge requirement to the Grassland Bypass Project in 1997, and the effluent limits in
the Phase II requirement in 2001 were based on the Total Maximum Monthly Load (California
Regional Water Quality Control Board 2001; Austin 2001, 340-341; Interview G-6).
Incorporation of Water Quality Trading
The selenium reductions outlined in the Use Agreement and waste discharge requirement
became the regulatory driver for the Grasslands Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program. Terry
Young and Chelsea Congdon of Environmental Defense first proposed a cap-and-trade system in
their 1994 report Plowing New Ground, which provided the framework for the Use Agreement
(Young and Congdon 1994; Interviews G-1 and G-12).' 8 Young and Congdon (1994)
envisioned a two-tiered system in which the Bureau set a regional reduction limit, provided
monitoring, and imposed penalties for exceedances while the Grassland Area Farmers
administered the Tradable Loads Program among the seven districts internally. After allocating
the regional load among districts, each member district could either meet its share or purchase
load allocation from other districts (Austin 2001, 338). Young felt that trading would be the
optimal regulatory system because it would meet the pollution cap;' promote cost-effectiveness;
offer a flexible, decentralized strategy that districts could tailor to best meet their needs; promote
equity through initial permit allocation; utilize existing monitoring systems to verify compliance;
and minimize districts' and agencies' administrative costs (Young and Congdon 1994, ES-12).
15 The Second Use Agreement, granted in 2001 and extending the contract through 2009, allowed the region to earn
incentive credits to offset future annual fees if discharges are less than 90 percent of the annual limit (USBR 2001,
5, 44; Young and Karkoski 2000, 157).
16 Remaining constant at Site B still required discharge reductions because of lower attenuation rates in the San Luis
Drain than in the wetlands channels (Interviews G-1).
17 Load limits vary by type of water year (extending from October through September) because wet years lead to
increased river flows, which subsequently allows more selenium to enter the San Joaquin River without violating
water quality concentration standards (Young and Karkoski 2000, 157; Interviews G-1 and G-2).
18 Environmental Defense, a U.S. nongovernmental organization that had been involved in implementing trading to
reduce sulfur dioxide under the 1990 Clean Air Act, is known for proposing free-market instruments.
19 As Chapter 2 explains, tradable permits should result in more definite pollution levels than offset fees but at the
expense of some uncertainty in abatement costs (Kolstad 2000, 144). Although the Grassland Area Farmers could
opt to pay incentive fees for mild exceedances, the threat of Use Agreement termination provided a strong impetus
for the region to meet selenium load limits.
Unlike many other nonpoint sources, trading among the districts was feasible because they could
record or estimate selenium loads by monitoring drains and sumps. The Grassland Area Farmers
funded a Regional Drainage Coordinator and a Field Coordinator to collect and prepare the seven
20districts' loading data (Interview G-3). Consequently, the program became one of the first
water quality trading programs exclusively among nonpoint sources. However, this degree of
accountability was not viable at the farm level because costs associated with increased
monitoring and reporting would likely exceed efficiency gains (Interviews G-1, G-2, G-6, G-8).
Based on interest garnered by Plowing New Ground (Young and Congdon 1994), the Water
Authority received a federal grant to hire environmental lawyer Susan Austin. The Grassland
Basin Drainage Steering Committee convened an Economic Incentives Advisory Committee
composed of Austin as project director, a district farmer, an EPA regulator, Young of
Environmental Defense, and a professor in University of California at Davis's Department of
Environmental Science and Policy to design the program. After iterations in June 1998 and
January 1999, the Steering Committee passed the final Grassland Basin Drainage Steering
Committee Rule Enforcing Selenium Load Allocation and Establishing a Tradable Loads
Program for Water Year 2000 in October 1999 (Austin 2001, 353, 392; Interviews G-1, G-8).
The Advisory Committee devised rules for trading but left prices up to individual districts to
negotiate. Assigning a penalty fee structure and allocating selenium among districts were the
two greatest challenges that the Advisory Committee had to define, revise, and compromise on
over the course of the deliberations (see Table 3-1).21, 22 Because districts could monitor their
total discharges at a single point before these loads entered the San Joaquin River, the Tradable
Loads Program did not have to safeguard against hotspots or assign trading ratios to compensate
for uncertainty or disparate downstream impacts (Austin 2001, 372).
20 In addition to the Grassland Area Farmers' water quality monitoring efforts at Site B and throughout the drainage
area, the Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board monitors wetland water quality and the Bureau funds
monitoring throughout the region. The Bureau pays the U.S. Geological Survey to collect water quality data at Site
B (from which load levels are based) and U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and California Department of Fish and
Game to collect and monitor selenium levels in invertebrate and fish samples throughout the drainage area and
wetlands. The San Francisco Estuary Institute, considered independent and neutral, compiles and publishes data
from these sources. These data are considered reliable and accurate (Interviews G-2, G-5).
21 The final Tradable Loads Rule required districts that exceeded their allocation to pay their proportional share of
the Bureau's incentive fee had the whole region exceeded limits by the same percentage. Districts discharging less
than their allocation also received rebates equal to the lowest possible price per pound incentive fee that the Bureau
would issue. Penalties and rebates were issued annually rather than monthly to allow districts greater flexibility,
ease program administration, and decrease uncertainty by allowing trading after the year's monitoring data were
available (Austin 2001, 354-5, 359-61; Interviews G-6, G-8). Rebates and fees somewhat decreased the need to
trade because districts could simply earn or pay them rather than seek trading partners (Austin 2001, 361-63).
22 District allocations equally weight three factors contributing to selenium loads: area drained, area irrigated, and
selenium concentrations (Austin 2001, 354-5, 359-361; Interviews G-1, G-2, G-6, G-8).
In summary, the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program was born out of a nationally-
publicized crisis that threatened a region's primary industry. In a compromise to sustain
agriculture and protect wildlife, districts, agencies, and environmentalists came together and
adopted a cap and trade system as a decentralized mechanism to achieve unprecedented and
stringent selenium reductions.
Saving the Pamlico River
Encompassing 30,000 square miles, the Albemarle-Pamlico watershed is the second largest
estuarine system in the United States after Chesapeake Bay (Albemarle-Pamlico National
Estuary Program undated). The Tar-Pamlico basin comprises almost 20 percent, or 5,570 square
miles, of this system and is located completely within North Carolina (see Exhibit 1). From its
source near the Virginia border, the Tar River flows approximately 140 miles through the rural
Piedmont, past hog, cattle, and crop operations in the Coastal Plain, widens at Washington to
become the Pamlico River, a tidal estuary, and travels another 35 miles before entering the
Pamlico Sound (DENR 2004, Pamlico-Tar River Foundation 2007). The basin has traditionally
supported valuable fisheries. However, anoxic zones known as "dead water" seriously
threatened this economic base, recreational opportunities, and the estuarine ecosystem in the
mid-1980s. The commercial fishery in the Pamlico River and Sound at the time totaled
approximately $20 million, or one-third of the state's catch (Tursi 1987, 1). Fishermen and
environmentalists voiced alarm over declining yields that they posited could be linked to
Table 3-1
GRASSLAND AREA FARMERS ANNUAL SELENIUM ALLOCATION,
BY DISTRICT
District Acreage d Selenium Load Limit (lbs)
(Above Normal)a, e
Broadview Water District b 9,520 395
Camp 13 Drainage District 5,490 108
Charleston Drainage District 4,310 145
Firebaugh Canal Water District 22,300 593
Pacheco Water District 5,180 238
Panoche Drainage District 42,300 1,485
Widren Water District 840 15
Other 7,490 0
Total 97,430 c 3,088 r
Notes:
a Selenium load limits vary by type of water year, ranging from wet to critical.
b Broadview Water District sold its water allocation and no longer irrigates.
C Totals may not sum due to rounding.
Sources:
d Derived from San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water Authority (1996).
e Derived based on selenium load allocation provided by Panoche Drainage District
(2007) and annual load limit data from San Francisco Estuary Institute (2007).
f San Francisco Estuary Institute (2007)
23multiple causes including anoxia or hypoxia (Tursi 1987, 1, 10-11; Interview T-8). Although
some uncertainty existed, the North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) reported that approximately 78 percent of the nitrogen responsible for the hypoxic
conditions entered the estuary from nonpoint sources including agricultural, rural, and urban
runoff; 19 percent came from point sources including sewage treatment plants; and two percent
from the country's largest phosphate mining and fertilizer plant located on the Pamlico's
southern bank (Tursi 1987, 6).24
The North Carolina Environmental Management Commission designated the basin as Nutrient
Sensitive Waters in 1989 due to eutrophication in the upper Pamlico. Unique to North Carolina,
the designation means that a water body is subject to excessive algal growth and thus requires
additional management to control nutrients (typically nitrogen, the limiting resource in estuaries,
and phosphorous, the limiting resource in freshwater) (DENR 2006a).25 The Commission
required the Department of Environment and Natural Resources to develop a basin-wide, site-
26specific nutrient management strategy. Although they only attributed about 20 percent of
3 Hypoxia refers to oxygen deficiency, and anoxia is more severe oxygen deprivation. Nutrient discharges cause
these conditions because estuarine waters are typically nitrogen-limited, meaning that more algae can grow when
additional nitrogen enters the system. The subsequent algal blooms die as they sink and receive less light. Bacteria
consume oxygen as they decompose the dead algae, creating the low-oxygen conditions known as hypoxia or
anoxia. This process is known as eutrophication.
24 The agency was called the Division of Environmental Management (DEM) at that time.21 Unlike a 303(d) listing specified in the federal Clean Water Act, the Nutrient Sensitive Waters designation does
not necessarily mean that a water body is currently impaired; rather, it means that water is prone to impairment
(Interview T-8).
26 The Environmental Management Commission exercises discretion as to whether it requires the Department to
develop a nutrient management strategy and rules for water bodies designated as nutrient sensitive. The high-profile
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nitrogen loads in the basin, the Department's nutrient strategy initially focused on point sources,
in part because they were the only regulated nutrient dischargers in the watershed at the time
(DENR 2004, 62; Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004, 227; Interview T-7). Primarily sewage treatment
plants, these point sources possessed individual NPDES permits issued by the Department's
Division of Water Quality for other pollutants. However, effluent limits for nitrogen and
phosphorous did not exist in the state.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources initially proposed reducing nitrogen and
phosphorous loads from point sources by imposing uniform concentration limits on all effluent
from sources discharging more than 0.5 million gallons of wastewater per day (mgd) (Interview
T-3). Sewage treatment plants objected that such regulations would unduly burden them; back-
of-the-envelope calculations suggested the proposed concentration limits would reduce nutrient
loads from point sources by approximately 30 percent but would cost roughly $50 to $100
million (Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004, 227; Interviews T-3, T-6, T-7, T-8). With these concerns in
mind, one municipality approached John Hall, a lawyer and former EPA policy analyst and
engineer now working with Washington D.C.-based Hall & Associates. Hall suggested that the
plants cooperatively identify an alternative nutrient reduction strategy that would achieve similar
outcomes at less cost. The Tar-Pamlico Basin Association (the Basin Association, or the
Association) formed in 1989 with the proposal that its 12 municipal members aggregate their
nitrogen and phosphorous loads and meet reductions under a group cap instead of accepting
nutrient effluent limits as part of their individual NPDES permits (Interviews T-3, T-6).
The Association went about selling the Division of Water Quality, the Pamlico-Tar River
Foundation (the Foundation), a small grassroots organization founded in 1981 to protect the
watershed, and Environmental Defense, the national non-governmental organization that also
featured prominently in the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program, on their idea.
27
,
28
Meanwhile, members also commenced reducing nutrient discharges in anticipation of future
limits (Interviews T-6).
Incorporation of Water Quality Trading: Program Design
The structure of the Tar-Pamlico River Basin Nutrient Offset Program differs
significantly from the Grassland Area Farmer Tradable Loads Program's cap and trade system.
The Basin Association may purchase credits from the North Carolina's Agriculture Cost Share
Program, administered by Department of Environment and Natural Resource's Division of Soil
and Water Conservation, to fund the implementation of best management practices on farms in
the basin if sewage treatment plant nutrient loads exceed the group cap. Unlike the Grassland
fish kills in the 1980s prompted the Commission to require that the Department develop a strategy for the Tar-
Pamlico basin (Interview T-3).
27 The Department of Environment and Natural Resources sought buy-in from the Foundation and Environmental
Defense since they were instrumental in pressuring the Commission to make the Nutrient Sensitive Waters
designation and were lobbying the Department to develop a nutrient strategy plan (Interview T-6).
28 Sources interviewed disagree over whether John Hall or staff at Environmental Defense initially proposed water
quality trading (Interviews T-6, T-7, T-8). Hall was familiar with water quality trading from his work at EPA,
whereas Environmental Defense was a well-known proponent of market-based instruments, most notably sulfur
dioxide trading under the acid rain title of the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.
program in which drainage districts are the primary pollution source, offsetting is possible in the
Tar-Pamlico Basin because point sources are not the major nutrient source. In addition,
offsetting appealed to treatment plants because they believed that agricultural nonpoint sources
could achieve the same nitrogen reductions more cost-effectively.29 The specifics of the Nutrient
Offset Program evolved over the course of three phased agreements among sewage treatment
plants, state agencies, and environmental organizations.
Phase I Agreement
The North Carolina Divisions of Water Quality and Soil and Water Conservation, the Tar-
Pamlico Basin Association, Environmental Defense, and the Pamlico-Tar River Foundation
jointly developed and signed the Phase I Agreement of the nutrient strategy. Although the
Environmental Management Commission did not formally approve Phase I until February 13,
1992, it covered 1990 to 1994 and included:
e Group cap on combined nitrogen and phosphorous loads from Basin Association
members that decreased by almost 20 percent from 525,000 kg/year in 1991 to
425,000 kg/year in 1994; 30,31
" Ability of Association to offset loads that exceeded the group cap by buying
credits from the Agriculture Cost Share Program (Nutrient Offset Program);
e Upfront payments from Basin Association into Agriculture Cost Share
Program totaling $850,000. Approximately $150,000 came from the Association
directly, and federal grants from EPA funded the remaining $700,000; and
* Development of estuary model funded by a federal grant to the Association to
estimate the level of nutrient reductions that would minimize chlorophyll a (an
indicator of eutrophication) standard violations in the Pamlico River.
The Agreement is not a formal state rule; rather, it falls under contract law (Interviews T-3). In
lieu of nutrient effluent limits, the 12 initial Association members' NPDES permits refer to the
Agreement and group cap. However, it is not a group NPDES permit (Interview T-1), and
members lack individual allocations. Instead, the group cap is internally managed as a
"gentleman's agreement"V among members that all will do their best to reduce nutrient loads
(Interviews T-1, T-3, T-6). If the Basin Association fails to meet its load reductions, EPA has no
jurisdiction to intervene and enforce (Interview T-2). Table 3-2 lists Association members.
29 The offset system evolved from the Association's initial proposal to pay the North Carolina Agriculture Cost
Share Program the costs of installing enough best management practices to reduce an equivalent amount of nutrient
loads; they estimated this cost to be approximately $11.8 million. The Association shifted tactics after a few initial
payments (Interview T-3). Offset rates and credits were based upon the cost and estimated nutrient removal
capacity of best management practices that the Agriculture Cost Share Program installed in North Carolina's
Chowan Basin (Interview T-3).
30 Although Phase I covered 1990-1994, signatory parties agreed that 1991 was the first year that Association
members had to monitor nutrient discharges and track reductions (EMC 1994, 5).
31 The cap was derived from expected reductions resulting from proposed concentration limits rather than the
estuary's need (Interview T-3).
Table 3-2
TAR-PAMLICO BASIN ASSOCIATION MEMBERS
Date Joined 2005 Average Percent 2005 Nutrient Percent Load
Flow (MGD) Flow Load
Rocky Mount 1991 11.019 37.73% 74,159 26.93%
Greenville 1991 9.165 31.38% 108,076 39.25%
Tarboro 1994 2.106 7.21% 38,073 13.83%
Washington 1991 1.942 6.65% 4,685 1.70%
Oxford 1991 1.111 3.80% 8,873 3.22%
Robersonville 1999 0.653 2.24% 5,761 2.09%
Louisburg 1991 0.620 2.12% 1,953 0.71%
Belhaven 1991 0.397 1.36% 4,370 1.59%
Enfield 1991 0.454 1.55% 2,003 0.73%
Warrenton 1991 0.433 1.48% 6,108 2.22%
FWASA 1991 0.494 1.69% 4,585 1.67%
Scotland Neck 2002 0.340 1.16% 7,532 2.74%
Pinetops 1992 0.210 0.72% 3,427 1.24%
Spring Hope 1991 0.157 0.54% 4,436 1.61%
Bunn 1991 0.105 0.36% 1,291 0.47%
National Spinning 1994 0.258 0.70% 2,913 0.85%
(closed 2005) (2003) (2003) (2003) (2003)
Total -_1 _ 1_ 29.206 100.00% 275,331 100.00%
Note: Total does not include National Spinning, which closed in 2005.
Source: Tar-Pamlico Basin Association (2007b)
EPA was not involved in the Phase I nutrient strategy agreement, in part because no TMDL had
been developed for the basin (Interview T-9). At the time, few TMDLs existed and the Phase I
Agreement was one of the first cases where a form of water quality trading was a compliance
option. Several sources noted that if the program were developed today when TMDLs are more
common and EPA has issued water quality trading guidance, the program would incorporate
more stringent accountability mechanisms such as a group NPDES permit (Interviews L, T-2, T-
3, T-6).
The Basin Association surpassed its Phase I nutrient reductions by hiring a consultant to perform
optimization studies at member plants to identify low-cost operational improvements that would
reduce nutrient loads.32  These relatively simple modifications which members began to
implement in 1989 allowed the Association to collectively achieve 80 percent of its Phase I
reduction target (Interviews T-6, T-7). Second, the Association agreed that each member would
install biological nutrient removal when conducting other plant modifications (DENR 2004, 62).
Implementing nutrient removal simultaneously with other plant construction saved substantial
capital. The Association can expel members that do not install nutrient removal at the time of
other plant renovations, but it has not been necessary to date (Interview T-6).
Under the Nutrient Offset Program, the basin's Agriculture Cost Share Coordinator uses revenue
generated from offsets and upfront payments to locate lands where best management practices
32 For example, one plant significantly reduced its nitrogen by decreasing the amount of time that sludge was stored
on site (Interviews T-6, T-7).
3 One stakeholder estimated that adding biological nutrient removal on its own at a plant would cost $1 million, but
it would only add $200,000 to other project costs (Interview T-6).
would have the greatest impact on estuary water quality, identify willing farmers, and cover 75
percent of installation costs. 4 The process typically takes three years from first contact with a
farmer to a fully-functioning best management practice (Interviews T-4, T-5, T-6).
The upfront funds generated nitrogen credits at a rate of $56/kg based on the estimated cost-
effectiveness of best management practices multiplied by a 2.1:1 trading ratio. The 2:1 is for
uncertainty and the additional 0.1 accounts for administrative costs (EPA 1999, 26; Fisher-
Vanden et al. 2004, 226). 35,36 Through the upfront payments, the Association accrued 22,660 kg
of nitrogen credits intended to expire at the end of Phase II on December 31, 2004. However,
Association funds were just a fraction of the money coming into the basin to support agricultural
best management practices, and many other sources had strict expiration dates. Therefore, the
Coordinator prioritized spending other funds, and approximately $30,000 of Phase I money
remains unused (Interviews T-1, T-4, T-5). The Association argued and other Agreement
partners granted that it should continue to receive credit for these initial payments since they will
produce future nutrient reductions. Consequently, a nitrogen credit balance of 12,604 kg remains
from Phase I (DENR 2006b; Interviews T-1, T-3).
In addition to being a type of water quality trading between point and nonpoint sources, offsets
resemble a pollution tax to point sources because they maintain the option to discharge more
than their allocation by paying a fee (Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004, 227). The certainty of total
nutrient discharges depends on the reliability of offset reductions. If best management practices
are implemented promptly and maintained properly, fewer nutrients enter the estuary. However,
Phase I delays and questions of practice efficacy created uncertainty regarding discharge levels
(Kolstad 2000, 144). Given that nutrients are less toxic than selenium and do not bioaccumulate,
greater uncertainty in discharge levels in the Tar-Pamlico Basin yielded less acute environmental
or public health risks than similar fluctuations in the Grassland Area.
For the final component of Phase I, Association members agreed to comply with reductions from
a 1991 baseline that the estuary model calculated would reduce chlorophyll a water quality
standard violations in the estuary (EMC 1994). It reported that no increase in total phosphorous
and 30 percent total nitrogen reductions would address the majority of violations and
substantially improve dissolved oxygen levels, while 45 percent total nitrogen reductions would
eliminate violations (EMC 1994, 7). The estuarine model became the basis of the water body's
TMDL, which EPA approved in 1995 although it is less rigorous than models used in more
recent TMDL analyses (Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004, 227-8; DENR 2004, 63, Interview T-2).
34 After the nonpoint source rule adoption, only counties that complied with agricultural nonpoint source targets
could receive best management practices funded by Basin Association credits (Interview T-6).
35 This ratio does not attempt to estimate the effect of source location on nutrient deliveries to the estuary, also
known as a transfer coefficient. Rather, it treats a pound of nitrogen the same whether it occurs in the upper reaches
of the watershed and partly denitrifies before reaching the estuary or is discharged directly into the estuary.
36 Although free-market proponents argue that trading partners should set prices through negotiation, one
stakeholder noted that the state needed to set the offset rate in order to avoid potential price volatility associated with
a thin market (Interview T-2).
Phase II Agreement
Given lingering uncertainty and concerns regarding the feasibility and costs of a 45 percent
nitrogen reduction, the Phase II Agreement called for a 30 percent reduction across all sources
and no increase in phosphorous loads from 1991 levels. It recognized that further reductions
might be necessary in the future (EMC 1994, 7-10). The Basin Association could still offset any
nutrient exceedances and maintained credits accrued in Phase I. The Association also agreed to
pay $44,400 per year on average to fund a portion of the Tar-Pamlico Agriculture Cost Share
Coordinator's position and support a U.S. Geological Survey monitoring gage on the Tar River.
At a revised offset rate of $29/kg, the Association annually earned approximately 1,520 nitrogen
credits for future exceedances, or less than 0.4 percent of its annual nitrogen cap (DENR 2006b,
2007).
Point sources discharging more than 0.5 mgd that were not Association members were subject to
individual concentration limits within five years. Facilities also had to offset any increased
nitrogen and phosphorous loads from construction or expansion (EMC 1994, 13; DENR 2004,
62). No facilities had to comply with these limits because they discharged less than 0.5 mgd,
joined the Basin Association, or connected their flows to an Association member, and no
expansions or new plants occurred. By the end of Phase II, the Association had expanded from
12 to 16 members and accounted for 93 percent of the basin's point source discharges (DENR
2004, 66).
The Phase II Agreement also called for nonpoint sources to reduce nitrogen by 30 percent and
not increase phosphorous over 1991 levels. Initially the Environmental Management
Commission planned to meet these objectives by increasing efforts, targeting, and coordination
among existing voluntary programs, but it determined that these programs were insufficient and
initiated a NPS rulemaking process in 1998. Of the rules for riparian buffers, stormwater,
nutrient management, and agriculture which became effective in 2000 and 2001, only the
agriculture rule addressed existing runoff without a land use change trigger (DENR 2004, 63).
Notably, Environmental Defense and the Pamlico-Tar River Foundation did not sign on to Phase
II because of concerns that: 1) the group cap should be a 45 percent nitrogen reduction and
discrepancies in the baseline needed to be addressed; and 2) voluntary nonpoint source programs
were inadequate (Interviews T-1, T-4, T-5, T-6, T-8).38 Despite opposition from the
environmental community, the Division of Water Quality moved forward with Phase II, which
spanned from 1995 to 2004.
37 The riparian buffer rule protected existing buffers, the nutrient management rule required fertilizer applicators (not
including residential landowners) to take state-sponsored nutrient training or develop nutrient management plans for
fertilized land, and the stormwater management rule required new development to reduce nitrogen runoff 30 percent
below pre-development levels and hold phosphorous discharges constant. The agriculture rule required 30 percent
nitrogen reductions and no phosphorous increases from existing land (DENR 2004, 63).
38 The Division of Water Quality had to specify what portion of the reduced load should come from point and
nonpoint sources. Earlier estimates suggested that point sources accounted for 15 to 20 percent of nitrogen entering
the estuary (Tursi 1987, 6; Interviews T-6, T-7, T-8). To give credit to upgrades that the Association had made as
part of the optimization studies prior to 1991 without resetting the model baseline, the Division agreed to only
apportion 8 percent of necessary reductions to point sources (EMC 1994, 11; Hall 2004; Interviews T-6, T-8).
Phase III Agreement
Environmental Defense and the Pamlico-Tar River Foundation returned to the table for Phase III
negotiations. The recent rulemaking addressed their nonpoint source pollution concerns, and
they felt they could contribute rather than just react to the nutrient strategy as signatories
(Interview T-1, T-5, T-8). 3 9 The Divisions of Water Quality and Soil and Water Conservation,
the Basin Association, Environmental Defense, and the Foundation signed and the
Environmental Management Commission approved an initial Phase III Agreement in April 2005,
but some outstanding issues remained in early 2007:
e Offset rate: A North Carolina State University team is re-evaluating the average
offset rate weighted by best management practice cost-effectiveness and
feasibility within the basin (Interviews T-6, T-7);
* Credit-earning activities: Environmental groups objected to the Association's
credit accrual for funding part of the Agriculture Cost Share Program
Coordinator's position and U.S. Geological Survey gage since these activities do
not directly reduce nitrogen loads. The Association holds that the Division of
Water Quality requested the funding and it would not have agreed without credit
(Interviews T-1, T-4, T-5, T-6). Environmentalists are also concerned that larger
programs already fund agricultural best management practices.4 0 To ensure that
offsets actually induce additional change, they suggest funding stormwater
retrofits not currently covered by nonpoint source rules. However, the
Association resists paying substantially more for credits out of fairness to
wastewater rate payers (Interviews T-1, T-3, T-4, T-5, T-7, T-8); and
* Appropriateness of cap: Environmental groups advocate a 45 percent nitrogen
reduction. The Division of Water Quality agreed to reopen the TMDL and
consider other nutrient management options if any portion of the estuary remains
impaired in 2013 (EMC 2005, 19; Interviews T-3, T-5, T-6, T-8).
Parties will submit a revised Agreement to the Environmental Management Commission in
2007. Consensus exists that the Association will hit its cap in approximately ten years due to
population growth, so parties view resolving issues as important before the Nutrient Offset
Program really comes into use (Interviews T-1, T-3, T-5, T-8).
Monitoring
Basin Association members submit weekly discharge, upstream, and downstream water quality
data to the Division of Water Quality. 41 The Association also compiles and compares its
members' annual load data to the group cap and submits these data to the Division (EMC 1995;
Interviews T-1, T-7). The Division bases official nutrient numbers on the monthly point source
39 The Association was also pleased that the state adopted NPS rules since these sources contribute the majority of
nutrient loads to the estuary (Interview T-6).
40 When the Nutrient Offset Program was first developed, the Agriculture Cost Share Program faced budget
shortfalls and needed additional funds to complete projects (Interviews T-1, T-6).
41 The Division maintains the discretion to allow less frequent monitoring (EMC 2005).
submissions, but they are typically very similar to the Association's reports (Interviews T-1, T-
5).42
No one appears to doubt the reliability of regular point source monitoring data, but concerns
exist regarding lack of data. For instance, the state manages ambient water quality monitoring
but does not collect data along tributaries; conditions within whole portions of the watershed are
unknown. In addition, agriculture nonpoint source pollution is estimated based on modeling
rather than monitoring, and only approximately ten percent of best management practices are
inspected annually (Interviews T-4, T-5). Farmers found in noncompliance pay back just the
Cost Share money (Interview T-4).43 Although stakeholders did not report problems with
noncompliance (they did express uncertainty over best management practice effectiveness), this
system suggests that monitoring and enforcement mechanisms do not ensure functional best
management practices. Given concerns regarding lack of data, the Association and Division of
Water Quality entered into a Memorandum of Agreement in October 2006 allowing Association
members to form a monitoring coalition and gather ambient water quality data in lieu of
reporting up- and downstream water quality data at specific distances from plants (DENR
2006c). This strategy would coordinate efforts and methods, reduce redundancy, and provide a
better understanding of conditions throughout the watershed (Interviews T-1, T-4, T-5, T-6, T-7,
T-8).
In summary, the Tar-Pamlico Basin faces three major challenges: nutrient loading that causes
eutrophication, lack of data, and insufficient nonpoint source accountability. The Basin
Association accepted a group cap on nutrients and the option to both offset and trade loads
internally in exchange for avoiding costly, individual effluent limits. It has also provided
funding to increase knowledge of the basin. Agencies, the Association, and environmental
interests continue to negotiate the exact terms of this program since point sources will likely rely
on it more in the coming years.
Enacting a Plan to Restore Long Island Sound
The Long Island Sound case bears similarities to both the Tar-Pamlico Basin Nutrient Offset
Program and the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program. The Sound is the nation's
third largest estuary after Chesapeake Bay and the Albemarle-Pamlico Sound. It stretches 110
miles from east to west between Long Island and Connecticut, with only two outflows at either
end. The Sound reaches 21 miles at its widest point. Its 16,000 square-mile watershed receives
drainage from five states: Connecticut, New York, Massachusetts, Vermont, and New
Hampshire (EPA 1994, 2-3). It is the only watershed I evaluate that is not completely contained
within one state.
Similar to the Pamlico River, the Sound suffered highly publicized fish kills due to hypoxic
conditions caused by nutrient loads in the 1980s (see Exhibit 3-3). Particularly severe fish kills
42 Some concerns exist over whether nutrient discharges during spills are fully counted (Interviews T-1 and T-5).
4 Kolstad (2000, 205) explains that the optimal fine equals the marginal damage of the action divided by the
probability of being caught. If the marginal damage equaled the amount that the Agriculture Cost Share Program
paid the farmer to install the best management practice, then the fine should theoretically be ten times that amount to
deter farmers from gaming the system and not maintaining their best management practices.
in 1987 and 1988 led
waste washing ashore
to proclamations that the Sound was dying. Other events such as medical
also increased the salience of water quality problems (Interview L- 1).
I Source: EPA (2007)
In 1985, Connecticut, New York, and EPA formed the Long Island Sound Study (EPA 1998).
Again similar to the Albemarle-Pamlico Sound, Long Island Sound joined the National Estuary
Program in 1987 (EPA 2007). Unlike the North Carolina estuary, however, Connecticut's
Nitrogen Credit Exchange Program did not become effective until 2002, after years of planning
and analysis (CTDEP 2006). In the interim, the Study developed a Comprehensive Conservation
and Management Plan, released in 1994.
The Plan identified six problem areas: hypoxia; toxic contamination; pathogen contamination;
floatable debris; impact of water quality problems and habitat loss on living resources; and
detrimental effects of development on water quality and habitat. It prioritized addressing the
hypoxic dead-zone that appeared in late summer in the western portion of the Sound (EPA 1994,
2). The Study also adopted a phased approach to reducing nitrogen: Phase I, which started in
1990, froze nitrogen loads at current levels; Phase II, beginning in 1994, called for low-cost
nitrogen reductions throughout Connecticut and New York similar to the optimization
modifications by Tar-Pamlico Basin Association members in the late 1980s and early 1990s; and
Phase III, adopted in 1998, required the two states to develop watershed plans, incorporate
nitrogen limits into point source permits, and conduct nonpoint source management and habitat
restoration with the goal of reducing nitrogen loads by 58.5 percent within 15 years from 1999
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levels. The states would have to meet 40 percent of this target in 2004 and 75 percent in 2009
(EPA 1998, 6, 13, 22-23).44
Phase III of the Long Island Sound Study also called for the Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection (the Department, or CTDEP) and the New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) to jointly develop a TMDL that would allocate nitrogen
load reductions from point and nonpoint sources within the two states to achieve dissolved
oxygen standards (EPA 1998, 22). Interestingly, one source familiar with the process noted that
the Department of Environmental Protection actively pushed for TMDL development in order to
lend authority and enforcement mechanisms to the policies that it would adopt to meet Phase III
objectives. Policymakers recognized that a strong regulatory driver was necessary to induce
dischargers and the state to financially commit to the nitrogen reduction strategies identified in
the comprehensive planning process (Interview L-5).
The TMDL formalized and specified many of the findings that had already been agreed upon in
Phase III of the Study (Interview L-1). Unlike the previous two cases, the majority of the 53,270
tons of nitrogen (73 percent) delivered to Long Island Sound from Connecticut and New York
came from point sources. 45 Of this in-basin load, approximately 15,760 tons, or 30 percent of
nitrogen reaching the Sound after natural attenuation, comes from Connecticut wastewater
treatment plants (CTDEP and NYSDEC 2000, 15). Consistent with Phase III of the Long Island
Sound Study, the TMDL called for a 58.5 percent annual reduction of in-basin nitrogen loads by
2014 in order to substantially reduce the incidence of hypoxia in Long Island Sound and its
detrimental impact on marine life.4 6 Taking into account feasibility and cost-effectiveness, the
TMDL assigned a wasteload allocation requiring point sources to decrease loads by 64 percent in
Connecticut and 59 percent in New York and a load allocation requiring nonpoint sources to
reduce nitrogen discharges by ten percent in both states (CTDEP and NYSDEC 2000, 25; EPA
2007; Interview L-1).
Incorporation of Water Quality Trading: Program Design
Although water quality trading was a known tool that EPA was interested in pursuing in the late
1990s, the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange was largely the brainchild of Robert
Moore, former Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Environmental Protection
(Interviews L-1, L-2, L-4). Moore recognized that sewage treatment plants faced different
nitrogen reduction costs. Further, the hydrodynamic model developed as part of the Long Island
Sound Study and TMDL process demonstrated the varied effects of nitrogen discharges on
dissolved oxygen conditions; loads from the northeastern portion of the state had far less impact
44 The two primary reasons for the 15-year compliance schedule were: 1) it allowed facilities to save money by
combining denitrification components with other plant modifications as they became necessary; and 2) there were
insufficient public funds to support all upgrades at once (Interviews L- 1, L-2, L-5).
45 The remaining nitrogen comes from runoff, tributaries upstream of Connecticut, and boundary fluxes at the
Sound's eastern and western outlets. Also, nitrogen delivered is less than total nitrogen discharged; portions of
discharges natural attenuate before reaching the Sound (CTDEP and NYSDEC 2000, 12, 18).
46 To meet water quality standards, the TMDL noted that in-basin reductions would be coupled with reductions of
nitrogen and carbon from out-basin sources, non-treatment actions, and a margin of safety. Similar to the Tar-
Pamlico basin, an annual limit was selected because nitrogen levels throughout the year contribute to hypoxic
conditions, and hypoxia is not sensitive to daily or short-term loadings (CTDEP and NYSDEC 2000, 25).
on hypoxia in the western reaches of the Sound due to natural attenuation than discharges from
the southwestern corner (CTDEP and NYSDEC 2000, 12; EPA 1998, 10-11; Moore et al. 2000,
ES-1-3; Interviews L-1, L-2, L-4). Phase III of the Study also reported differences in sewage
treatment plant capital costs per unit of oxygen improvement and set point source nitrogen limits
at this "knee of the curve" to maximize oxygen improvements per dollar spent. 47 The Study
opted not to assign stricter concentration limits to more cost-effective plants given uncertainties
regarding actual costs and other considerations. Rather, it imposed uniform reduction targets but
left effluent trading as an option to redistribute abatement efforts more cost-effectively (EPA
1998, 11-12, 15; Interviews L-1, L-2). The Department of Environmental Protection held public
hearings to discuss point sources' wasteload allocation and potential nitrogen trading as part of
the TMDL process (CTDEP and NYSDEC 2000,3).
New York chose not to pursue interstate trading, so Connecticut began designing its own
program (Fisher-Vanden et al. 2004). Moore, who had left the Department, secured a grant that
enabled a working group to develop a nitrogen trading program. Moore's group proposed the
following components to the Department and the Connecticut General Assembly:
e Equalized nitrogen credits: All sewage treatment plant nitrogen discharges are
normalized by their equivalency factor so that discharges equal the amount of
nitrogen reaching portions of the Sound most prone to hypoxia.48 These
equivalency factors are derived from the TMDL's hydrodynamic model (see
Exhibit 3-4);49
e General Permit: One General Permit covers, nitrogen discharges from all
sewage treatment plants in the state. The permit gradually decreases so that by
2014 it achieves a 64 percent nitrogen load reduction consistent with the TMDL
wasteload allocation. The permit allows plants to comply by either reducing
nitrogen discharges onsite or purchasing equalized nitrogen credits;
e Nitrogen Credit Exchange: Administered by the state, the Nitrogen Credit
Exchange is a clearinghouse for plants that have not met their individual
reduction targets to buy equalized nitrogen credits and plants that have reduced
loads more than necessary to sell credits and generate revenue; and
* Clean Water Fund support: Municipalities may finance necessary plant
upgrades through the Connecticut Clean Water Fund. The Fund provides grants
for 30 percent of nutrient removal costs and offers two percent, 20 year loans for
the remainder. It also covers the Nitrogen Credit Exchange's administrative
4 Using Department of Environmental Protection data, the Long Island Sound Study plotted estimated capital
expenditures against modeled improvements in the Sound's oxygen levels for each treatment plant. The "knee"
occurred where the slope of oxygen improvement per dollar began to level, indicating that less improvement was
occurring for each additional dollar. The Study calculated that upgrades only at plants with above-average cost-
effectiveness would reduce nitrogen delivery by 62 percent (EPA 1998, 10; Interviews L- 1, L-2).
48 For example, the hydrodynamic model estimates that if Hartford discharges ten pounds of nitrogen, only two
pounds will reach the portions of Long Island Sound prone to hypoxia and eight pounds will naturally attenuate en
route. Therefore, Hartford has an equivalency factor of 0.20 (CTDEP 2006, 9).
49 Another term for equivalency factor that appears in the pollution trading literature is "transfer coefficient"
(Kolstad 2000, 156). The use of equivalency factors assigned based on the region in which a sewage treatment plant
is located makes it a zonal fee system. This system is a compromise between the efficiency of an ambient fee
system, which considers the impact of space on overall pollution levels at the receptor, and the simplicity of an
emissions fee system, which considers only the amount discharged (Kolstad 2000, 163-164).
costs and any discrepancies between credit purchases and sales.50  Sewage
treatment plants may still participate in the Nitrogen Credit Exchange if they do
not use the Fund to finance nutrient reduction (Moore et al. 2000; CTDEP 2007,
5, 7; Interviews L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4).
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Moore's group estimated that the Nitrogen Credit Exchange would save over $200 million in
capital costs and reduce the total number of necessary upgrades compared to requiring all plants
to meet the same standard. The program could also hasten water quality improvements by
prioritizing nutrient removal efforts in the areas with the greatest impact on dissolved oxygen
levels (Moore et al. 2000, 1-4; 3-4 - 5). Finally, it would reward facilities that upgraded sooner
and more than necessary by allowing them to generate revenue from their investments (EPA
2007; Interviews L-1, L-6).
With support from EPA, Connecticut's Governor, and the Department of Environmental
Protection, the Connecticut General Assembly passed Public Act 01-180, An Act Concerning
Nitrogen Reduction in Long Island Sound, that established the Nitrogen Credit Exchange in June
2001; it took effect in 2002 (CTDEP 2006; Interview F). The Department issued a General
Permit for the state's 79 sewage treatment plants, giving them a choice to join with the option to
trade or receive an independent nitrogen effluent limit. All sources opted to join and have since
remained in the program (CTDEP 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007; Interviews L-1, L-2).
50 The Clean Water Fund derives its resources from federal grants and state revenue and general obligation bonds
(CWF Advisory Work Group 2007, 9-11).
W E
Note: Numbers refer to each zone's equivalency factor, or portion of nitrogen discharged
from these zones that reaches the portion of the Sound most prone to hypoxia.
Source: EPA (2007)
The Act also created the Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board to assist and advise the Department of
Environmental Protection in the administration of the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit
Exchange. The Board comprises 12 members representing agency interests and a variety of
sewage treatment plant sizes and locations in order to get an equal distribution of buyers and
sellers; it is appointed by the Governor and General Assembly (Connecticut General Statutes
Sections 22a-521 - 527). The Board recommends the price of an equivalent nitrogen credit to
the Department based on that year's capital and operating costs of per-pound equivalent nitrogen
reduction at all facilities receiving Clean Water Fund grants and loans. 1 The equalized nitrogen
credit value has more than doubled from $1.65 in 2002 to $3.34 in 2006 (CTDEP 2003, 7-8;
CTDEP 2007, Att. B). By March 31 of each year, the Department completes its audit of plant
discharges, sends them a statement declaring whether they must purchase credits or receive
payment, and specifies the annual equivalent nitrogen price. Plants must purchase credits by
July 31, and the Department will buy excess credits from plants by August 14 (Connecticut
General Statutes Sections 22a-521 - 527; Interviews L-2, L-4).
The Nitrogen Credit Exchange is a compromise between a quantity-based instrument like the
Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program and a price-based instrument. Despite its
revenue-neutral design, the exact amount of load reduction in any given year is somewhat
uncertain since credit purchases do not have to equal sales. Like the Nutrient Offset Program,
sewage treatment plants could potentially opt not to reduce and instead buy credits. However,
the ability to earn revenue from upgrades by selling credits creates a greater incentive to reduce
than just the avoided cost of an offset (Interview L-1).52 Furthermore, EPA could require
individual permits instead of the General Permit or withhold federal support for the Clean Water
Fund if the program causes plant discharges to exceed the TMDL's wasteload allocation; EPA
lacks this enforcement mechanism in the Tar-Pamlico basin (Interviews L-2, L-3, L-4, L-5, T-2,
T-3, T-6).5 Given that nitrogen is less toxic than selenium and does not bioaccumulate, greater
uncertainty in exact discharge levels in any given year yields less risk than it would in the
Grassland Area (Interview L-5).
Of the three cases, Long Island Sound had the most data, greatest accountability among sources,
largest market, and longest planning process pre-dating the trading program. The Long Island
Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange applied to all sewage treatment plants in Connecticut and
encouraged them to reduce nitrogen in a way that could save money, generate revenue, and
prioritize change where it would have greatest impact on water quality.
Summary
The catalyst and design of the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program, the Tar-
Pamlico River Basin Nutrient Offset Program, and the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit
Exchange bear multiple similarities (see Table 3-3). They all formed as alternatives to
prescriptive regulations that seemed likely in response to a highly-publicized environmental
si The equalized nitrogen credit values represent subsidized rates because the capital costs do not include expenses
covered by Fund grants and assume a two percent interest rate (CTDEP 2003, 7-8).
52 The state pays the difference if more sewage treatment plants sell credits than buy, and it deposits excess revenues
into the Clean Water Fund if the opposite occurs (Interviews L- 1, L-2, L-4).
53 A few sources felt that such intervention by EPA would be unlikely (Interviews L-4, L-5, 0-2).
problem. All dischargers accepted group limits on previously unregulated pollution, and
program design and implementation led to the establishment of institutions aligning with
watershed boundaries. Further, each program emerged from phased negotiations involving a
variety of state, discharger, and environmental interests. Chapter 5 assesses the indirect and
unexpected outcomes associated with these conditions and how they might contribute to future
pollution reductions.
Despite these similarities, three different market-based instruments emerged with varying levels
of quantity and price certainty. The Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program involved
the strictest limit on discharges, in large part because selenium is an acute toxic with impacts
more sensitive to short-term fluxes (EPA 2004, 5; Interviews 0-2, L-5). The number of market
participants and degree of state involvement also varied across cases. The following chapter
discusses how these variations led to differences in dischargers' decision to trade.
Table 3-3
SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADING PROGRAMS
Grassland Area Tar-Pamlico River Basin Nutrient Long Island Sound
Farmers Tradable Offset Program Nitrogen Credit
Loads Program Exchange
Pollutant Selenium (acute) Nitrogen and Phosphorous (chronic) Nitrogen (chronic)
Regulatory Driver San Luis Drain Use Nutrient Sensitive Waters Long Island Sound
Agreement a Designation TMDL
Design Cap and Trade External: Offset; Credit Exchange
Internal: Potential Cap and Trade c
Buyer 7 Drainage Districts External: 1 TPBA' (PS ') 79 sewage treatment
(NPS d) Internal: 15 TPBA ' members (PS *) plants (PS e)
Seller 7 Drainage Districts External: Farmers (NPS d) 79 sewage treatment
(NPS d) Internal: 15 TPBA f members (PS*) plants (PS*)
Clearinghouse No External: State-run Agriculture Cost State-run Nitrogen Credit
Share Program; Internal: No Exchange
Reduction Quantity High External: Medium; " Internal: High Medium
Certainty g Price Low External: High; Internal: Low Medium
Notes:
a The Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board has since issued a waste discharge requirement to
the Grassland Area Farmers; the Use Agreement and waste discharge requirement limits are identical.
b The Tar-Pamlico Basin Association retains the ability to purchase offset credits if nitrogen discharges exceed
the group cap. These offsets fund nitrogen reductions from agricultural land in the basin.
C The Basin Association may meet its group cap however it chooses. Although outside sources have posited that
an internal cap and trade exists and members have discussed the possibility, members report that they have not
established such a system to date.
d Nonpoint source
* Point source
fTar-Pamlico Basin Association
g High quantity certain means that the total amount of pollution discharged is definite; low means that total
discharges may vary or exceed the cap. High price certainty means that definite limits on compliance costs exist,
whereas low certainty means that costs are largely unknown.
h The level of certainty regarding nitrogen discharges ranges from low to high, depending on whether it is
assumed that agricultural best management practices are implemented on schedule and achieve their estimated
reductions.
CHAPTER 4: EXPLAINING VARIATIONS IN TRADING ACTIVITY
In Chapters 1 and 2, I explain that three major challenges to water quality improvements are 1)
difficulties getting point and nonpoint sources to comply with more stringent water quality-based
regulations; 2) incomplete information on the sources and impacts of pollution on water bodies;
and 3) funding pollution reductions, particularly at publicly-owned sewage treatment plants. As
Chapter 2 explains, much of the pollution trading literature cites its ability to maximize the
benefits of limited resources by achieving cost-effective solutions as the major benefit of trading.
This chapter discusses whether the three programs realize this goal. I argue that market-based
instruments can achieve cost-effective outcomes only if dischargers use them. Despite the
deliberations that went into the three programs' formation, however, only the Long Island Sound
Nitrogen Credit Exchange demonstrates active trading (see Table 4-1), indicating that market-
based instruments for the most part did not perform their primary function of redistributing
pollution reduction efforts cost-effectively.
Table 4-1
SUMMARY OF TRADING ACTIVITY ACROSS CASES
Grassland Area Farmers Tar-Pamlico River Basin Long Island Sound Nitrogen
Tradable Loads Program' Nutrient Offset Program 9 Credit Exchange h
Market Activity None; some trading in past External and Internal: Active
None to date; expect future
trades
Years with 2 out of 9 0 out of 16 a 5 out of 5
Activity
Peak Year 605 of 5,124 discharged lbs; b -- 3,197 of 14,182 equalized lbs
Trading Activity 12% (1999) Never offset or traded discharged/day; 23% (2004)
Price Avg $40/lb monthly allocation $13.18/lb d $3.34/equalized lb*
or $1 00/lb annual allocation c
a Does not include credits accrued from upfront payments in Phase I or annual payments in Phase II.
b This figure overstates monthly allocations exchanged in 1999 because it includes quantities for one trade in
1998. This figure also does not include the 128 pounds of annual allocation (2 percent of limit) that were
exchanged in 1999 to prevent double-counting.
' Based on average value of trades in water year 1999, which was the last time districts reported trades.
d Based on offset rate of $29/kg, which has been rate since 1994.
e 2006 e ualized nitrogen credit value.
Sources: Austin (2001); g North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural Resources (2006b);
h Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (2003; 2004; 2006; 2007).
I attribute differences in activity to varying levels of conditions necessary to support trading that
are either cited in the literature and described in Chapter 2 or identified in my assessment of the
three cases. The additional conditions that I identified are whether trading was the most
affordable strategy for dischargers and the ability of dischargers to incorporate trading into their
long-term plans. 54 Table 4-2 compares whether these components existed in each case, and I
argue that the variation in trading activity results from whether trading was the most affordable
5 I distinguish cost-effectiveness as the solution that minimizes expenditures from all sources. In contrast,
affordability only refers to the costs incurred by dischargers.
strategy available to dischargers, the ability to incorporate trading into long-term planning, and
the magnitude of transaction costs compared to savings. The key difference in transaction costs
is the presence of political transaction costs among dischargers in the California and North
Carolina cases and the mitigation of these costs through state involvement in Connecticut. To
support this argument, I describe the differences in trading activity among programs and then
explain how the conditions necessary to support trading varied and why they enabled or deterred
program use.
Table 4-2
COMPARISON OF ACTIVITY AND NECESSARY TRADING CONDITIONS
Grassland Area Farmers Tar-Pamlico River Long Island Sound
Tradable Loads Basin Nutrient Offset Nitrogen Credit
Program Program Exchange
Activity
Dischargers Actively Trade No No Yes
Necessary Trading Conditions a
Regulatory Driver' Yes Yes Yes
Suitable Pollutant b Questionable Yes Yes
Most Affordable Strategy' No No Yes
Ability to Plan Around Trades' Questionable Questionable Yes
Difference in Marginal Costs No No Yes
Exceeded Transaction Costs d
Responsive to Price Signals Questionable Questionable Questionable
Increased Adaptability' Questionable Yes Questionable
a I describe necessary trading conditions identified by EPA (2003a, 2004), Easter et al. (1997), Kolstad (2000),
and Scholz and Stiftel (2005) in Chapter 2. Additional necessary conditions that I identified are denoted (c). I
argue that conditions shaded in yellow explain variation in trading activity.
b I discuss the role of these conditions in Chapter 3.
' The literature that I reviewed did not identify these components, but their role was apparent in the three cases.
d I discuss three types of transaction costs: 1) insufficient information and 2) market thinness are discussed in the
literature and Chapter 2; I define and identify 3) political transaction costs as another impediment to trading.
e I discuss whether trading better prepared policymakers and stakeholders to adapt water quality strategies in
Chapter 5.
Summary of Tradina Activity
Very few or no trades occurred in the California and North Carolina cases, demonstrating that
market-based instruments did not directly lead to pollution reductions by enabling a more cost-
effective allocation of abatement across individual dischargers in the two watersheds. The
Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program featured some trading in its early years. An
initial exchange between Charleston and Panoche drainage districts in 1998 made the internal
allocation distribution acceptable to all districts (Austin 2001, 354). As of February 2000, nine
trading agreements consisting of 39 separate component trades occurred between districts.
Besides the initial Charleston-Panoche arrangement, these trades covered loads in water year
1999. The transactions resulted in 605 pounds of monthly load allocations, 128 pounds of
annual load allocations, and $14,320 changing hands, compared to an annual load limit of 6,327
pounds and annual discharges of 5,124 pounds in 1999 (see Table 4-1). Loads typically traded
for $40 per pound for monthly loads and $100 per pound for annual loads based on the 1999
monthly and annual rebates of $50 and $120 per pound, respectively (Austin 2001, 380-381).
Individuals familiar with the Tradable Loads Program report that few trades occurred between
2000 and 2006." They claim that trading alone would not allow the region to meet its
increasingly restrictive limits and rising marginal abatement prices (Interviews G-1, G-2, G-3, G-
5, G-6, G-11).
The Nutrient Offset Program comprised two types of market-based instruments. First and most
discussed in Chapter 3, the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association (the Basin Association) had the
ability to offset any nutrient discharges that exceeded its group cap by purchasing nitrogen
credits from the North Carolina Agriculture Cost Share Program. Second, more informal and
almost identical to the Tradable Loads Program, the Association maintained authority to induce
members to meet the group cap however it chose, including with an internal cap and trade
system in which some members who reduced nutrient discharges more than required could sell
their excess allocation to others. 56 However, neither type of trading has occurred in the Tar-
Pamlico Basin to date outside of initial Phase I payments and annual support of the Agriculture
Cost Share Program Coordinator and U.S. Geological Survey gage. The Association has banked
28,960 kg of nitrogen credits through these payments, or approximately seven percent of its
current annual nitrogen cap (DENR 2006b; 2007). Although some compared the annual credit
accruals to an insurance policy, the small amount of credits substantiates others' claims that if
and when the Association exceeds it cap, it will spend the banked credits rapidly and need to
offset (Interview T-7).
Districts and Basin Association members would have found the Tradable Loads and internal
nutrient trading programs more useful if they preferred reducing loads independently and
exchanging among those over or under their allocation. According to a 1990 federal-state
interagency study, decreasing agricultural water use, or source control, represented one way that
growers and districts could reduce selenium loads in the Grassland Area (San Joaquin Valley
Drainage Program 1990; Environmental Defense undated a). Onsite reductions were the
districts' primary strategy in the early years when the few trades did occur (Austin 2001, 378-9;
Grassland Area Farmers 2006, 2-4; Interviews G-2, G-3, G-4, G-8, G-9, G-10, G-12).
One striking similarity between the cases is that cooperation mitigated the need for trading. In
the Grassland Area after 1999, districts transitioned away from trading onsite reductions to a less
expensive regional strategy by combining their resources and attracting grant support, described
in the Most Affordable Strategy section. Likewise, the Basin Association did not need to use
offsets or internal trading because pooling members' resources to hire a consultant allowed them
ss Internal documents suggest that some selenium was traded among districts in 2005 and 2006, although no
stakeholders acknowledged these trades.
56 An internal cap and trade or nutrient fee system would require the Basin Association to assign members
individual nutrient allocations. Such assignment was possible with data gathered by the Association, but it was not a
component of the group cap system as of early 2007 (Interviews T-6, T-7).
57 Source control efforts included tiered water prices, irrigation improvements, canal lining to reduce seepage,
workshops, and low-interest loans for efficient irrigation equipment. Some crop transitions also reduced irrigation
in the Grassland Area. Finally, districts used state and district funds to construct recirculation systems that conveyed
drainage water back into irrigation distribution systems. Selenium load reductions were not the only reason districts
and growers implemented these strategies. They also sought to reduce water use because of severe drought in the
late 1980s and early 1990s that led to improved water management and decreased discharges. Further, transitions to
crops requiring less irrigation were driven by broader economic forces than the need to reduce selenium loads alone
(Austin 2001, 378-9; Grassland Area Farmers 2006, 2-4; Interviews G-2, G-3, G-4, G-8, G-10, G-12).
to achieve significant reductions through low-cost modifications. Implementing nutrient
removal at a few facilities kept the Association well below its group cap despite increasing
discharge flows by seven percent from 1991 to 2004 (DENR 2004). It is also noteworthy that
trading still could have accompanied these solutions; though unnecessary, it remained an option.
Therefore, subsequent sections explore what deterred dischargers in both cases from generating
revenue off of variations in onsite reductions or purchasing offsets.
Unlike the other two cases, all sewage treatment plants have actively and consistently
participated in the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange since the program's inception
(see Tables 4-1 and 4-3). In 2004, the year with the highest percentage of credits traded, the
average of total credits bought and sold on the Exchange was $2,223,270, or 1,170,142 equalized
pounds of nitrogen.58 This figure represents 3,197 equalized credits per day, or 21 percent of the
permitted amount (15,444 equalized nitrogen pounds per day) and 23 percent of the daily
average discharges (14,182 equalized nitrogen pounds per day) (CTDEP 2007, Att. E).
Table 4-3
LONG ISLAND SOUND NITROGEN CREDIT EXCHANGE ACTIVITY
(2002 - 2006) a
2002" d 2003* 20049 2005h 2006
Facilities Selling Credits 39 40 35 29 32
Facilities Buying Credits 38 37 44 50 47
Parti atioBuyers) / 79] * 100% 97% 97%' 100% 100% 100%
Maximum Sold $624,400 $600,400' $517,600 $279,100 $357,500
Minimum Sold $0 $900' $200 $0 $400
Maximum Bought $272,600 $378,700' $347,900 $513,400 $996,000
Minimum Bought $200 $3,000' $100 $100 $500
Total Sales $2,757,300 $2,428,600 $2,659,800 $1,315,400 $2,281,400
Total Purchases $1,317,200 $2,116,900 $1,786,700 $2,466,700 $3,949,900
Balance (Sold - Bought)' $1,440,100 $311,800 $873,100 -$1,151,333 -$1,668,500
Notes:
a Figures rounded to the nearest hundred.
b Sewage treatment plants did not participate in the Nitrogen Credit Exchange if their discharges exactly equaled
their permit limit. They still were part of the General Permit, however.
C Numbers may not add due to rounding. Negative values indicate that facilities exceeded the General Permit
limit in that year.
Sources:
d Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (2003), 8-9, unless otherwise noted
e Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (2004), 2, unless otherwise noted
f Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (2004), App. F
g Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (2006), Att. H, unless otherwise noted
h Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection (2007), Att. E, unless otherwise noted
Trading activity enables the redistribution of pollution reduction efforts for more cost-effective
outcomes. However, opinions differ as to how well the Nitrogen Credit Exchange and Clean
Water Fund actually prioritized upgrades at least-cost facilities. Some claimed that the
program's design inherently facilitated upgrades at plants with the most impact on dissolved
58 Conversion based on 2004 equalized nitrogen credit value of $1.90 (CTDEP 2006, Att. H). I take the average
rather than the sum of equalized credits bought and sold to prevent double-counting. Likewise, I would not count 20
for ten pounds bought and ten pounds sold for a ten-pound trade.
oxygen conditions and that the Fund increasingly prioritized projects with greater denitrification
benefits. Others cited examples of Fund projects that did not generate substantial credit sales as
evidence that the system was not achieving its cost-effectiveness goal (Interviews L-1, L-2, L-3,
L-4). Despite debates over whether the program maximized cost-effectiveness, plants'
willingness to participate and the fair portion of equalized nitrogen loads passing through the
Exchange indicate that dischargers were at least willing to redistribute reduction efforts, the first
step to achieving lower cost outcomes. Therefore, this chapter analyzes what variations in
design and conditions made benefits large enough and sufficiently minimized transaction costs in
just one case so that trading became a worthwhile compliance mechanism.
Chapter 3 describes the regulatory driver that prompted trading and pollutant suitability for
market-based instruments in each case; Chapter 5 discusses whether trading contributed to
pollution reduction efforts beyond increasing cost-effectiveness. The remaining sections of this
chapter explain whether the necessary conditions to support trading outlined in Table 4-2 existed
in each case and why these conditions create variations in trading activity. I demonstrate that the
presence of a more affordable strategy, ability to plan, and magnitude of transaction costs
relative to savings accounted for the variation in trading among these cases. Within the
transaction cost discussion, I argue that political transaction costs, a previously overlooked
obstacle, had the greatest impact on dischargers' decision to utilize market-based instruments.
Most Affordable Strategy
Chapter 2 explains that dischargers should theoretically want to trade in order to reallocate
pollution reduction so that abatement occurs for less. However, dischargers have no incentive to
trade if a more affordable alternative exists. I distinguish cost-effectiveness as the solution that
minimizes expenditures from all sources. In contrast, affordability only refers to the costs
incurred by dischargers. The level of trading activity in the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit
Exchange suggests that it was the most affordable solution available. If sewage treatment plants
could secure Clean Water Fund support, upgrading and selling credits generated revenue.
Purchasing credits in the interim was cheaper than immediate upgrades (Interviews L-3, L-4).59
In the remaining two cases, dischargers did not exercise their option to trade in part because
more affordable strategies emerged.
Low-cost operational changes among all members enabled by pooling resources to hire a
consultant and nutrient removal implementation at a few facilities kept the Tar-Pamlico Basin
Association well below its group cap (Interview T-4). Insufficient data make it impossible to
determine whether the Association could have achieved the same reductions for less by
purchasing more nitrogen credits. Members had not calculated the portion of plant upgrades for
nutrient removal specifically to determine the per-kilogram cost, although this analysis was
feasible (Interview T-6, T-8). Furthermore, facilities with nutrient removal did not seek
compensation from others. These two findings suggest some factor other than affordability
drove the decision not to trade.
59 Credit sales do not generate enough revenue to cover debt repayments; sewage treatment plants would not
perform upgrades solely to sell credits. However, if they are performing upgrades, they will estimate revenue that
they can generate from sales upon project completion (Interview L-3).
In contrast, Grassland Area districts ceased relying on onsite selenium reductions and trading
whatever loads were over or under district allocations in favor of a more affordable regional
solution known as the San Joaquin River Water Quality Improvement Project (SJRIP). In
response to a 1995 lawsuit brought by Westlands Water District, the district that delivered
selenium-laden drainage to Kesterson, a federal appeals court ruled in 2000 that the U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation was responsible for solving the San Joaquin Valley's drainage challenges
(Martin 2007). Consequently, the Bureau engaged in a Re-Evalation Study to explore alternative
drainage management solutions, including reuse (Interview G-12). SJRIP was a demonstration
project that, if successful, could be replicated on a larger scale elsewhere in the Area or in
Westlands.
Initiated and managed by Panoche Drainage District, the regional goal was to completely
eliminate discharges into the San Joaquin River (Interview G-3). 60 Under SJRIP, the Grassland
Area Farmers purchased land and converted it to a Regional Reuse Area. Instead of discharging
into the San Luis Drain and San Joaquin River, SJRIP irrigated a range of salt tolerant crops with
a mix of fresh and drainage water. Subsurface drains collected this water. As it evapo-
transpirated, the drainage volume decreased and salt and selenium concentrations increased.
Reuse did not reduce selenium; rather, the objective was to decrease drainage volume, store it in
the ground, and eventually treat it with reverse osmosis or another strategy to remove and
dispose of selenium elsewhere or perhaps incorporate it into a marketable product. Reuse
reduced drainage volume by approximately 73 percent (San Joaquin River Exchange Contractors
Water Authority et al. 2003, 8, 17; Interviews G-1, G-2, G-3, G-8, G-12). Until the Grassland
Area Farmers identify an affordable treatment process, however, SJRIP will require more money
to continue expanding the Regional Reuse Area for selenium storage purposes (Interviews G-3,
G-8, G-11, G-12).
The regional solution was more affordable to districts than individual actions because the
Panoche Drainage District Manager and Grassland Area Farmers Regional Drainage Coordinator
solicited federal and state funds to implement SJRIP. However, when including government
dollars, it was not the most cost-effective solution. In total, the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, a
state bond, California Division of Water Resources, and CalFed financed $23.5 million, or 97
percent of total project costs as of 2006. In contrast, districts contributed only $766,000, or three
percent of costs (Grassland Area Farmers 2006).61,62
To illustrate the subsidy's effect, the Regional Reuse Area did not support profitable crops such
as melons and tomatoes (Interview G-2). Instead, the influx of government money sustained less
* Panoche Drainage District is the largest of the Grassland Area Farmers districts, commands the most resources,
and has some of the worst drainage problems due to above-average selenium concentrations. These factors may
explain why Panoche Drainage District took the initiative and contributed a disproportionate amount of resources to
a regional approach; it has the most to gain or lose from the Use Agreement (Interviews G-4, G-10, G- 11).
61 Unpublished data from Panoche Drainage District (2007) indicate that districts paid almost $1.9 million in
participation fees to SJRIP between 2002 and 2007. If these fees were instead of the district contributions cited in
Grassland Area Farmers (2006), total SJRIP project costs were $25.4 million, and districts contributed over seven
percent of costs. If these fees were in addition to contributions cited in Grassland Area Farmers (2006), then total
SJRIP project costs were $26.1 million, and districts contributed approximately ten percent of costs. In any case,
2overnment subsidies cover at least 90 percent of selenium management costs in SJRIP.
Some stakeholders suggest that individual district load reductions became cost-prohibitive as selenium limits
decreased and marginal, per pound reduction costs rose (Interviews G-1, G-2, G-6, G- 11).
valuable, more salt-tolerant crops. As long as these wealth transfers continued, a market
distortion would deter districts from pursuing in-district source control and trading (Interviews
G-11, G-12).
SJRIP also induced cultivation on land that might otherwise be retired. Per-acre SJRIP fees
decrease if more land remained in production since the majority of the Reuse Area's costs such
as purchasing land, planting crops, and monitoring were fixed and few costs such as pumping
water were variable. Therefore, the marginal cost of sending an additional pound of selenium to
the Regional Reuse Area was relatively low. This condition would likely remain until the
Grassland Area Farmers identify a treatment process that removed selenium from drainage
water. Consequently, more district land sending water to the Area as of 2006 increased the
distribution of fixed costs and decreased average costs (Interview G-1).
Stakeholders seemed to agree that the small number, proximity, and good working relationships
among districts allowed them to pursue a regional solution. However, they disagreed as to
whether trading was a necessary or useful step in the evolution of a regional strategy to reduce
selenium loads. Some claimed that the Tradable Loads Program eased the transition between
forming the Grassland Area Farmers, meeting the initial Use Agreement limits, and pursuing a
regional drainage solution; it represented one of many useful tools to achieve reductions in the
early years until other options emerged (Interviews G-1, G-3, G-4, G-5, G-12). Others familiar
with the program felt that the Grassland Area Farmers could have transitioned into a regional
approach without attempting the Tradable Loads Program; one doubted that trading made any
contributions (Interviews G-2, G-8, G-10).
Districts might have continued to utilize Tradable Loads Program for longer if they had not
received government funds to initiate SJRIP. However, trading ceased because the wealth
transfer prevented districts and farms within the region from fully internalizing the costs of
selenium loads, driving down what they were willing to pay for selenium management
63(Interviews G-11, G-12). Because of the 2000 court ruling, however, these funds were not
debatable (Interview G-12). Yet concerns exist over the Reuse Area's long-term sustainability.
Without treatment, the toxic element becomes increasingly concentrated. I present evidence
supporting these concerns in Chapter 5, but it is important to note here that the Grassland Area
Farmers abandoned depending solely on onsite treatment and trading loads amongst each other
because a more affordable alternative emerged. Compared to historic loads of 12,700 pounds,
the Grassland Area Farmers managed selenium in 2003 by sending 5,100 pounds (40 percent) to
the Regional Reuse Area, discharging 4,000 pounds (32 percent) to the San Joaquin River via the
Grassland Bypass and San Luis Drain, and reducing 3,600 pounds (28 percent) through onsite
conservation activities, of which tradable loads was just one component (Grassland Area
Farmers 2006, 2).
63 The districts may not have remained under their limits without the Reuse Area and could have lost access to the
San Luis Drain as a result (Interview G-1). If the Regional Reuse Area cannot accept all drainage water to meet
increasingly stringent load reductions, districts may have to trade amongst each other again (Interview G-12).
Ability to Plan around Trades
The ability to trade or offset loads is most useful to dischargers if they can accurately foresee
future market parameters and rates in order to reliably incorporate trading into their long-term
plans. If the option or cost of trading is uncertain, dischargers may prefer alternative
management strategies to avoid being caught unable to trade and thus penalized for
noncompliance. Although no Tar-Pamlico Basin Association members voiced this concern
specifically, they might have optimized and implemented onsite treatment as the opportunity
arose rather than purchasing credits given some uncertainties surrounding the Nutrient Offset
Program. In recent years, Agreement signatories questioned when credits started and expired;
who should be liable for best management practice implementation; the offset rate; and valid use
of offset credits. If Association members must purchase credits for stormwater rather than
agriculture reductions, the offset rate would increase dramatically (Interview T-4, T-6, T-8).
These uncertainties might have encouraged sewage treatment plants to make onsite reductions so
that they could better comply if individual permits were issued or an unfavorable agreement were
reached.
The state-run Nitrogen Credit Exchange overcame this instability and allowed treatment plant
operators to plan by providing a guaranteed buyer and seller of credits and setting the credit
value (Interview L-1, L-3, L-4, L-6).64 Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection
(CTDEP) filled the role that Israel (2002, 245) envisions for the government in trading programs:
improving information regarding exchanges; reducing transaction costs associated with search,
bargaining, and implementation; increasing the probability that successful exchanges occur; and
reducing the risks to parties involved in transactions.
The most unreliable component of the Nitrogen Credit Exchange was Clean Water Fund
solvency. The Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board determined equalized nitrogen credit value by
dividing capital and operating costs of facilities receiving Clean Water funds by pound of
equalized nitrogen credit removed. However, the Fund kept capital costs artificially low by
providing a 30 percent grant and two percent loan. Although not obligated to use the Fund,
facilities preferred its favorable terms and the program became dependent on state funds
(Interviews L-1, L-3, L-4); consequently, more sewage treatment plants chose to purchase
artificially low credits in order to comply with the General Permit than to self-finance, upgrade,
and sell when the program was under-funded in 2005 and 2006.65 The pollution reduction
outcomes of this subsidy are discussed in Chapter 5.
In response to this criticism, it is important to note that the Clean Water Fund predated the
Exchange and most municipalities would have relied on it for facility upgrades regardless of the
Exchange. State revolving funds support sewage treatment plant upgrades throughout the U.S.
* Although the equalized credit price more than doubled in the Exchange's first five years of operation,
stakeholders reported the ability to predict future credit prices (Interviews L-1, L-4). Some plant operators also
calculated the level at which it became more cost-effective to reduce nitrogen onsite than purchase credits. By
estimating the rate of price increase, they could determine when it was most effective to begin planning a facility
upgrade (Interview L-4). Others state that potential revenues were not enough to induce upgrades; they were a
benefit, but not a basis for decisionmaking (Interview L-3).
65 One stakeholder suggested that if the Fund ceased and credit prices substantially increased, municipalities would
resist paying so much for credits and the Nitrogen Credit Exchange might dissolve (Interview L-3).
Furthermore, those familiar with the process note that funding shortfalls often delay sewage
treatment plant upgrades. Finally, excess revenues generated by the Exchange through credit
sales repay the Fund and help finance future projects. Therefore, they see the Nitrogen Credit
Exchange as an improvement over the status quo because it prioritized spending on projects
yielding the greatest water quality improvements (Interview L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4). These findings
support the argument that trading can improve water quality by maximizing available resources.
Finally, municipalities incorporated the Nitrogen Credit Exchange into their planning process
because of its credibility. Since the program was created and administered by the state, sewage
treatment plants were assured that purchasing credits was a legitimate compliance mechanism
(Interview L-1). None of the lingering debates over offset rates and valid credit actions that
possibly deterred facilities in the Tar-Pamlico from relying on the Nutrient Offset Program
existed in Connecticut. In summary, although state administration meant that the Nitrogen
Credit Exchange lost some free-market flexibility and efficiency, government involvement
legitimized the program and made municipalities more willing to participate.
Difference in Marginal Costs Exceeds Transaction Costs
Trading will not occur if transaction costs exceed gains in cost-effectiveness; a discharger must
save more money by paying another entity to reduce pollution than it expends in time and
resources to make the trade happen (Stavins 1995). Differences in water contracts, crops,
necessary irrigation levels, and selenium concentrations suggest that marginal reduction costs66
vary among Grassland Area districts (Interviews G-5, G-12). Stakeholders familiar with the
Tar-Pamlico Basin Association also indicated that some sewage treatment plants could more
readily reduce nutrients than others (Interviews T-6, T-7). Given the apparent differences in
marginal reduction costs, even larger transaction costs must have existed within the Tradable
Loads and Nutrient Offset programs to explain the lack of trading. This section explains which
costs deterred trading in California and North Carolina and how Connecticut overcame these
obstacles in the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange.
Insufficient Information
Dischargers must know their marginal abatement costs in order to determine at what price it
becomes advantageous to trade allocation or offset loads. District managers in the Grassland
Area may have lacked enough information about their own districts to evaluate potential trades.
Austin surveyed district managers to determine their understanding of selenium reduction
activities' costs and benefits. While most knew the total amount of selenium discharged and
costs of load reduction efforts, they were unsure how much these actions reduced loads or water
66 Districts with federal contracts in the Grasslands Basin charge approximately $75 per acre-foot of water,
compared to average costs of $20 per acre-foot among the exchange contractors (Interview G-5). Furthermore, the
Central Valley Project Improvement Act (1992) provided water to the wetlands north of the Grasslands Area by
"allocating off the top" of federal contracts for environmental purposes, thus reducing the amount of water available
to these districts (Interviews G-1, G-5). Differences in water prices do not affect all selenium reduction strategies,
however (Interview G-8).
use. Without quantifying the benefits of their actions, district managers could not accurately
identify prices at which they should buy or sell (Austin 2001, 379-380).
Similarly, the Basin Association has not calculated total capital investments for nutrient removal
within the basin. The analysis was possible, but without it the Association could not compare
average nutrient reduction costs across members to determine whether offsetting was more cost-
effective (Interview T-6). However, the fact that they had not calculated these costs and benefits
again indicates that minimizing costs was not the primary driver of nutrient management
decisions.
Information costs also most likely did not preclude a cap and trade system among Basin
Association members. If insights from participants in the Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit
Exchange provide an indication, sewage treatment plants knew how much it cost to reduce
specific amounts of nutrient discharges. Again, the fact that facilities were not using this
information to increase the cost-effectiveness of their efforts suggests that other types of
transaction costs deterred Basin Association members from trading.
Market Thinness
A small number of trading partners creates a condition of market thinness in which participants
cannot easily identify advantageous trades. Fewer transactions make it harder for dischargers to
equalize marginal abatement costs and achieve economic efficiencies that markets should
provide (Kolstad 2000, 170). Market thinness seems the obvious reason why trades did not
occur in California (seven districts) and North Carolina (12 to 16 point sources) but were active
in Connecticut (79 sewage treatment plants) (Austin 2001, 365; Interview G-8). 67 The Long
Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange had few transaction costs from information or market
thinness. State involvement eliminated costs associated with search and bargaining. Watershed
size, density of facilities, incentives to join, and authority under the General Permit resulted in 79
plants participating in the Exchange. As a result, 34 percent of facilities buying and selling
credits in 2006 exchanged less than $10,000 (CTDEP 2007). If transaction costs had been
higher, perhaps requiring additional staff to seek trades, these smaller exchanges would not have
been worthwhile (Interviews L-1, L-4).
Market thinness did not pose a direct obstacle to the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association's
participation in the external Nutrient Offset Program. The Association had a guaranteed price at
which it could purchase credits, thus reducing search, bargaining, and decisionmaking costs. 68
Lack of buyers did hinder the Agriculture Cost Share Program's ability to spend credit revenues
on best management practices, however, motivating the Division of Water Quality and
67 The Grassland Area Farmers did not increase the number of participants in the market by extending the Tradable
Loads Program to growers because it would have required substantial increases in the level and frequency of
monitoring, making transaction costs prohibitively high. Furthermore, activities on one field may influence
selenium levels underlying neighboring fields. In summary, it would be too difficult to create enough accountability
to support trading among growers (Interviews G-1, G-2, G-6, G-8).
68 The fixed price precluded any bargaining opportunities, including the possibility that the Association would have
opted to offset if it could have negotiated a lower nitrogen credit price. No stakeholders expressed the desire to
pursue bargaining, however.
environmental groups to suggest that the Nutrient Offset Program fund urban stormwater
retrofits as well (Interviews T-1, T-5, T-6, T-8). Nevertheless, market thinness did not limit the
Association's ability to participate in the Nutrient Offset Program.
On closer inspection, thin markets also did not explain the lack of activity within the Grassland
Area and internal Association cap and trade programs. Few partners would have limited
exchanges by increasing search and bargaining costs, but participants reported low transaction
costs because the small number and proximity of dischargers increased the frequency of
interactions. For example, monthly Steering Committee meetings provided an opportunity for
districts to exchange information on who was willing to trade. It was easy for them to find
partners and negotiate; districts reported that trades in 1999 on average took less than one hour to
negotiate (Austin 2001, 382; Interviews G-1, G-8, G-12).
Tar-Pamlico Basin Association members also could have overcome transaction costs of internal
trades through their familiarity and frequent contact at Association meetings. In fact, it appears
that no attempt was even made to bargain; facilities that upgraded and invested in nutrient
removal did not try to recover costs from other facilities that benefited from remaining under the
group cap without capital investment (Interviews T-6, T-7). Finally, Association membership
dues were distributed based on percentage of permitted wastewater flow rather than percentage
of total nutrient loads, although the latter was possible with available data (TPBA 2007a;
Interview T-7). In summary, no financial incentive existed among members to reduce loads
other than avoided individual permit costs. Despite the belief of free-market proponents that
economic rationale drove Basin Association members to reduce nutrients (Interview T-8), these
findings suggest that another type of transaction cost existed which deterred members from
offsetting and internal trading.
Political Transaction Costs
The two previous sections suggest that insufficient information and market thinness alone did not
prohibit offsets and trades. Therefore, I suggest that another force was at play which I call
political transaction costs and define as the costs that trades impose on relationships among
entities.
The incentive driving the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association and the Grassland Area Farmers to
keep discharges within the group limit was the desire to avoid individual permits and maintain
drain access to collectively sustain agriculture. Both organizations naturally gravitated toward a
team mentality to achieve these goals; they preferred collaboration for a regional solution over
competition with each other to minimize individual costs (Interviews G-1, G-4, G-5, G-10, G-
12). I attribute this preference to the political transaction costs that trading imposed on districts
and sewage treatment plants.
Stone (2002, 267) notes that individuals are not economically rational actors and social welfare
does not equal the aggregate of individual welfare. She also highlights that policymakers must
consider the effects of collective processes on individuals, adopting a "polis" rather than a
"market" view of society. More specific to this thesis, Breetz et al. (2005, 172) report that socio-
cultural goals and concerns as well as the financial bottom line shape farmers' decisions whether
to participate in water quality trading programs. Stone's distinction and Breetz et al.'s
observation might explain why Panoche Drainage District took the initiative with SJRIP, a
project that benefits the whole Grassland Basin. Providing further evidence that the Grassland
Area Farmers were not driven by short-term economic signals alone, one farmer and district
representative commented that districts' desire to stay below selenium limits was motivated more
by concern over bad press than by incentive fees (Young and Karkoski 2000, 158; Interview G-
1). Furthermore, when the seven districts exceeded their monthly load limits in early 2005 and
2006, they opted to discharge less in later months so that the region still met its annual limit.
This action did not save the Grassland Area Farmers money; they could have used accrued
incentive credits to cover annual incentive fees. However, the Grassland Area Farmers felt that
it would better serve their long-term interests to prove that they could remain under the annual
cap in order to maintain trust with regulatory agencies and environmental groups (Interview G-
1). Likewise, Stone (2002, 74-75) points out that most exchanges are part of long-term
relationships, and loyalty, politics, and alliances preclude perfect competition. Supporting this
observation, one informant reported that districts did not drive hard bargains when trading did
occur. They preferred maintaining a "neighborly" relationship rather than appearing to profit
from each other (Interview G-12).
Likewise, the peer pressure of achieving the Basin Association's goal was enough for members
to make operational modifications and install nutrient removal when upgrading their plants; no
one wanted to seem like they were taking advantage of the system and others' reductions by not
doing their part (Interview T-1, T-6, T-7, T-8). They neither needed nor wanted financial
incentives for their efforts, again indicating that asking sewage treatment plants to compensate
each other would impose a political transaction cost. To confirm that lack of compensation was
not just a matter of convenience, Association dues reveal that payments into the program to
retain Hall & Associates as a consultant, support the U.S. Geological Survey gage and the
Agriculture Cost Share Program Coordinator, develop a monitoring coalition, and other
miscellaneous expenditures did not impose undue costs on members (TPBA 2007a, Interview T-
7). However, political transaction costs would emerge if members tried to buy or sell nutrient
load allocations from each other. One stakeholder explained that it would be politically
unfeasible for a city or town council to approve payments to another municipality (Interview T-
7). Just as Grassland Area districts did not traditionally compete (Interview G-12),
municipalities did not want to seem like they were profiting from one another, overly reliant on
each other, or paying another town for its infrastructure. Instead, a perception existed that
members cooperatively met the cap by doing their share as opporunities arose (Interview T-6, T-
7).
Transaction costs do not prohibit market activity from ever occurring. Instead, costs must either
be minimized or benefits increased so that partners have enough to gain from trades or offsets
that they overcome these costs. Stakeholders explained that as population growth in the Tar-
Pamlico basin causes wastewater flows to increase, it will be harder for the Basin Association to
meet its group cap (Interviews T-1, T-3, T-6, T-7, T-8). At that point, they will appreciate the
opportunity to offset as a way to mitigate the risks of exceedances and might consider an internal
cap and trade or nutrient fee system to further induce nutrient reductions and distribute any offset
costs fairly (Interview T-6, T-7). Similarly, the Grassland Area Farmers traded until a regional
strategy emerged. As long as reduction goals are relatively easy, however, political transaction
costs deter Association and Grassland Area members from cost-effectively distributing the
financial burden of reductions.
The fact that sewage treatment plants actively participated in the Long Island Sound Nitrogen
Credit Exchange suggests that political transactions costs did not outweigh trading gains. I argue
that state involvement minimized these costs and allowed participants to demonstrate more
rational economic behavior.
Designers of the Nitrogen Credit Exchange considered alternatives in which municipalities
bargained directly with each other. Although more free-market, they abandoned this idea
because of concerns that wealthier southwestern municipalities with higher equivalency factors
would take advantage of northeastern towns. Not wanting to create a massive wealth transfer
among municipalities and knowing that towns would hesitate to pay and depend on one another
in order to comply with regulations, the state designed a system in which it acted as a
middleman. This solution seemed more acceptable to the public utilities who valued staying out
of trouble over generating revenue (Interview L-1, L-2, L-3, L-4). As a result, the Nitrogen
Credit Exchange and Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board overcame political transaction costs by
eliminating payments among municipalities. It made trading part of a compliance mechanism
rather than an opportunity to profit from other entities (Interview L-1).
Response to Price Si2nals: Disconnect Between Incentives and Dischargers
In addition to ease of transactions, a market-based instrument only functions if participants
receive clear price signals and internalize the external damages caused by pollution. Otherwise,
they have no incentive to reallocate pollution reduction responsibility in order to maximize
savings. The Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange and Tar-Pamlico Basin Association
were composed almost exclusively of sewage treatment plants.69 Although they face limited
budgets and must pass costs on to rate payers, wastewater treatment facilities do not compete for
customers and will most likely not cease operating for financial reasons. Kolstad (2000, 150)
questions how well governmental or quasi-governmental agencies with softer budget constraints
respond to economic signals since they do not have the same incentive to maximize cost-
effectiveness.
Connecticut sewage treatment plants may have participated in the Long Island Sound Nitrogen
Credit Exchange despite their softer budget constraints because of the Clean Water Fund-
subsidized equalized nitrogen credit values. The subsidy made participation more affordable
than self-financed, individual upgrades. The grant and low-interest loans also explain why the
Exchange was not revenue-neutral and loads exceeded permitted levels in 2005 and 2006 (see
Ability to Plan around Trades section and Chapter 5).
Misaligned incentives and market distortions explain why price signals were not strong enough
to induce onsite management and trading in the Grassland Area. First, the Tradable Loads
Program functioned at the district level, but growers substantially influenced selenium loads
69 The Basin Association included one industrial member, National Spinning, from 1995 until its closure in 2004,
and the Nitrogen Credit Exchange was tentatively beginning to incorporate industrial point sources in 2007 (TPBA
2007b; Interviews L-2, L-4).
because they made irrigation decisions. The incentives that districts received from the market-
based instrument were only indirectly passed on to growers through pricing, policy, information
sharing, and peer pressure; districts lacked the authority to directly control drainage from
growers. Yet insufficient monitoring and accountability prohibited viable trading among
growers (Interview G-1, G-6). Therefore, costs and benefits of behavior may have been too
dispersed to affect any real change. Second, government funding for drainage management
described in the Most Affordable Strategy section distorted the value of reducing selenium and
prevented districts from internalizing the full costs of selenium loads.
Summary
Compared to open, private sector markets for normal goods or trading among other types of
pollution, these three cases demonstrate that market-based instruments face many challenges
when applied to water quality. One of the purported benefits of trading is that it maximizes the
amount of pollution reduction possible with finite resources. Yet trades only achieve this
objective if 1) dischargers have sufficient incentive to identify the most cost-effective way to
meet load allocations; and 2) the most cost-effective and reliable option is paying another
discharger for a portion of their allocation and the ability to pollute after factoring in transaction
costs. Despite years of negotiation and planning, dischargers completed only a few initial trades
in the Grassland Area and no trades or offsets in the Tar-Pamlico basin between program
creation and the end of 2006, indicating that trading failed to improve cost-effectiveness.
The Grassland Area Farmers leveraged millions of dollars in government subsidies to manage
drainage, making the Regional Reuse Area more affordable than managing selenium through
individual efforts and relying on trades to redistribute these efforts. Consequently, a market
distortion prevented trading from becoming the most affordable solution. The Tar-Pamlico
Basin Association avoided having to pay for equivalent offsite reductions through the Nutrient
Offset Program by reducing loads onsite much less expensively than initially expected. Further,
programmatic uncertainties prevented Association members from reliably incorporating the
Nutrient Offset Program into their long-term plans. Finally, political transaction costs in both
cases strongly deterred partners from trading. Not wanting to compete and appear to take
advantage of one another, they pursued regional solutions instead.
The Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange demonstrates that state involvement can
provide legitimacy, neutrality, and credibility to create a market in which public utilities actively
participate. Although the Exchange's state control sacrificed some free-market components, it
minimized uncertainty and political transaction costs. As structured, however, the Exchange
depended on public funds and induced sewage treatment plants to exceed their group cap when
the state and federal government under-financed the Clean Water Fund. Beyond variations in
trading activity, the next chapter assesses the direct and indirect outcomes of program design,
utilization, and existence.
CHAPTER 5: UNEXPECTED CONTRIBUTIONS OF WATER QUALITY TRADING
This thesis asks how and to what extent water quality trading in practice contributes to the
outcomes that it promises in theory. Chapter 4 explains why the primary theoretical benefit of
trading, improving the cost-effectiveness of pollution reduction efforts, did not occur in two out
of three cases. This chapter examines whether dischargers in each program actually reduced
pollution loads regardless of trading activity and thus contributed to water quality improvements.
I also evaluate the unexpected outcomes of the three programs and consider how they could
benefit watershed planning efforts.
Although much of the economic literature focuses on gains in cost-effectiveness as the major
benefit of trading, surprisingly the most consistent contributions of market-based instruments
across the three programs were 1) increased willingness to comply with more stringent, water
quality-based standards; and 2) increased capacity for watershed management. Outcomes
contributing to the latter benefit were 1) better dynamics among diverse stakeholders; 2)
formation of organizations that align with watershed boundaries; and 3) increased information
collection, dissemination, and use. In this chapter, I discuss why these changes occurred and
how they could contribute to further water quality improvements. I also assess whether trading
improved the ability to adapt management strategies to new information and conditions (see
Table 5-1). Given the challenges to further progress under the Clean Water Act, these largely
overlooked contributions are significant.
Table 5-1
COMPARISON OF INTENDED AND UNINTENDED OUTCOMES AND ADAPTABILITY
Grassland Area Farmers Tar-Pamlico River Basin j Long Island Sound
Tradable Loads Program Nutrient Offset Program | Nitrogen Credit Exchange
Intended Outcomes
Achieved Pollution Yes -80% of years and 84% Yes - 100% of years General Permit: Yes - 60% of
Reduction Goals of months years; TMDL: Yes - 100% of years
Improved Water No - Less selenium in river, Yes - N and P down; less Yes - N down; DO up
Quality a but increasing egg-selenium impaired estuary
concentrations
Unintended Outcomes *
Willingness to Accept Yes Yes Yes
Regulation
Information Collection, Inconclusive b Yes Inconclusive b
Sharing, and Use
Formed Group Along Yes Yes Yes
Watershed Boundaries
Increased Ability to Adapt to Changing Conditions and Information
More Adaptable Inconclusive b Yes Inconclusive
a Changes in water quality cannot be attributed exclusively to the existence of market-based instruments.
b Trading programs were part of broader pollution reduction strategies, so unintended outcomes are not only the result of
dischargers' option to trade. Information collection and phased review also resulted from the Use Agreement and San
Joaquin River Water Quality Improvement Project in the Grassland Area and the Long Island Sound Study in Connecticut.
Direct Outcomes: Changes in Water Quality
The objective of market-based instruments is to achieve a more cost-effective distribution of
abatement efforts than would occur under a traditional, prescriptive regulation, therefore
lowering total compliance costs. Measures of program effectiveness should also address whether
pollution reduction occurred and the capacity for further water quality improvements increased.
An environmental outcome is easiest to measure if it can be compared to a specific target. The
ideal measure is whether the problem caused by the pollution (e.g., wildlife deformities, hypoxia,
or fish kills) has decreased. However, many of these effects have lags between changes in
pollution loads and observable effects. For instance, nutrients persist in the water column and
sediment, and changes in discharges may not affect dissolved oxygen levels for two to five years
(Interviews L-4, L-5). Selenium, an acute toxic, has a much shorter lag time; experts estimate
that eggs could contain measurable selenium concentrations and deformed embryos within
weeks of bird exposure (Boxall 2006; Interview G-13). These effects are also difficult to
measure because they are influenced by multiple variables. For instance, precipitation and
temperature affect the extent and duration of hypoxic zones. Finally, baseline and monitoring
data may not exist to document changes in water quality.
Given these complexities and the relatively short time since program implementation, I discuss
changes in second-best measures such as chlorophyll a and nutrient concentrations in the
Pamlico River and Long Island Sound. Again, however, these levels are subject to lags and
influence by factors beyond the trading programs' control. Therefore, I compare pollution loads
from regulated dischargers to reduction targets as another measure of environmental outcomes.
Comparison of Actual to Targeted Pollution Reductions
Table 5-1 and Exhibits 5-1 through 5-3 demonstrate that dischargers in all three watersheds
succeeded in keeping loads below the regulatory cap in the majority of months and years. The
Grassland Area Farmers have consistently discharged less than their selenium load limits with
the exception of the program's first two years and a few monthly exceedances in early 2005 and
2006. Members halved their total annual discharges between water years 1997 and 2006, from
approximately 7,100 to 3,560 pounds (see Exhibit 5-1) (San Francisco Estuary Institute 2007).70
Since April 1998, no subsurface drainage discharges from the Grassland Drainage Basin have
entered wetlands channels (San Joaquin River Exchange Contractors Water Authority et al.
2003, 7). The Tradable Loads Program only explains a small portion of the region's success in
meeting selenium limits, however, in part because multiple incentives and subsidies existed to
reduce selenium loads by other means.
70 The 1997 exceedance predated the first Tradable Loads Rule, and incentive fees totaled $60,500. The Oversight
Committee deemed exceedances between February and June 1998 to be "unforeseeable and uncontrollable events"
caused by El Nihio. The Grassland Area Farmers still paid $3,400 in fees for exceedances between July and
September 1998 (Austin 2001, 374). The Grassland Area Farmers have not exceeded annual limits since, but they
accrued approximately $250,000 in incentive fees for monthly exceedances in early 2005 and 2006 (Interview G-2).
However, the Oversight Committee allowed the fees to fund selenium reduction efforts that would not otherwise
occur (Interviews G-1, G-3, G-5).
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Without offsetting or internal trading, the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association (the Basin Association,
or the Association) has consistently remained well under its group caps of 30 percent nitrogen
reductions and no phosphorous increases even though wastewater flows rose by seven percent
since the start of the nutrient strategy's Phase I Agreement (see Exhibit 5-2) (DENR 2004, 63;
TPBA 2007b). Modeled estimations of nutrient reductions from agricultural lands suggest that
the majority of counties are meeting their nutrient limits for agriculture reductions as well
(Interviews T-4). The stormwater and buffer rules do not address existing nutrient runoff; they
only place restrictions on new development, raising concerns that these sources will not decrease
nitrogen by 30 percent (DENR 2004, 67; Interviews T-1, T-3, T-5).
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Exhibit 5-2
TAR-PAMLICO BASIN ASSOCIATION ANNUAL NUTRIENT LOADS
(1991 -2005)
600,000
a) 0 Agreement Cap
c! 500,000
2 400,000
=0 300,000
_0
c 200,000
:t: 100,000------ -
z
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Year
Source: Tar-Pamlico Basin Association (2007b)
Connecticut sewage treatment plants reduced nitrogen loads by 41 percent from 25,008
equalized pounds per day when the Nitrogen Credit Exchange started in 2002 to 14,637
equalized pounds per day in 2006 (CWF Advisory Work Group 2007, 5). Plants collectively
kept equalized nitrogen discharges below General Permit levels in 2002 through 2004 but
exceeded the limit in 2005 and 2006 (see Exhibit 5-3). Loads remained below the TMDL
allocation for all years, however (CTDEP 2003, 2004, 2006, 2007; Interview L-2). Further,
stakeholders believe that enough projects are in design and scheduled for completion that the
state will not violate its final TMDL wasteload allocation in 2014 (Interviews L-2, L-4).
Nevertheless, by staying below General Permit discharge requirements in only 60 percent of
years, the Credit Exchange had the lowest rate of meeting its reduction targets.71 This finding
indicates the need to differentiate between trading and pollution reduction. It is possible to
design a program that facilitates active trades, but that does not mean that water quality
improvements will necessarily occur.
The Nitrogen Credit Advisory Board, Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection, and
individuals familiar with the program explained that Clean Water Fund shortfalls caused credit
purchases to exceed sales in 2005 and 2006 (CTDEP 2006, 14-16; CTDEP 2007, 4; Interviews
L-1, L-2). As of early 2007, the Fund could not finance five projects that applied for support
because of general obligation bond rescissions in 2003 and 2004, no bond authorization in 2005,
and only $20 million in 2006 and 2007, compared to the average annual bond authorization of
$47.9 million from 1987 to 2002 (CTDEP 2007, 6).7 Recognizing the backlog in facilities
71 Reduction targets across the three cases do not represent equivalent efforts.
7 Federal grants and state bonds also finance the Fund is also (CTDEP 2007, 5). Federal funds can only be used for
the low-interest loans. However, the Connecticut General Statutes requires the Clean Water Fund to provide a state
requesting Fund support, the Department amended the General Permit to increase allowable
nitrogen loads for 2006. The General Permit still follows a reduction schedule so that permitted
levels in 2014 meet the TMDL wasteload allocation (CTDEP 2006, Att. B; Interview L-2).
Exhibit 5-3
LONG ISLAND SOUND EQUALIZED ANNUAL NITROGEN LOADS
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Measuring Changes in Water Quality
Conditions in the Pamlico River and Long Island Sound have shown some improvement since
program implementation, but it is impossible to attribute changes to specific strategies or
occurrences (Interviews T-3, T-5, T-6). North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Division of Water Quality determined that both total nitrogen and total
phosphorous concentrations demonstrated statistically significant reductions between 1991 and
2002 (DENR 2003, 2004, 64). Further, the percent of estuary classified as impaired decreased
by 90 percent between the 1994 and 2004 (DENR 1994, 57; Interview T-3). Trends in the
incidence of algal blooms and fish kills were harder to verify given the multiple contributing
factors and lags (Interviews T-3, T-4, T-5, T-9). Despite favorable trends in the estuary, some
stakeholders expressed concern that conditions in large portions of the watershed were unknown
due to insufficient monitoring. Further, some felt that the nitrogen reduction target should be 45
rather than 30 percent to adequately protect the estuary (Interviews T-5, T-8).
match of 30 percent for denitrification projects (state match levels vary by project type). Therefore, the bottleneck
in Fund availability is the state money available for grants, not the federally and state-funded low-interest loans
(CWF Advisory Work Group 2007, 9; Interview L-2). To address the backlog, CTDEP commissioner Gina
McCarthy convened a Clean Water Fund Advisory Group per the request of Governor Jodi Rell to evaluate options
that would allow the Fund to support wastewater facility upgrades for the purpose of improving water quality (CWF
Advisory Work Group 2007, 1).
73 Nitrogen concentrations at the Grimesland gage just upstream of where the Tar River widens into the Pamlico
decreased by approximately 18 percent between 1991 and 2002 (DENR 2003, 2004, 64)
Similarly, it is difficult to detect short-term changes in hypoxia in Long Island Sound. Ambient
water quality monitoring indicated decreased total nitrogen and chlorophyll a concentrations and
increased dissolved oxygen levels (U.S. EPA 2007; Interview L-1). However, it is impossible to
isolate effects of the Nitrogen Credit Exchange from other actions adopted as part of the Long
Island Sound Study.
The various strategies to manage selenium in the Grasslands Area, of which storage in the
Regional Reuse Area predominated and the Tradable Loads Program was relatively minor,
successfully reduced selenium discharges into the San Joaquin River. However, wildlife
continued to be exposed to the toxic element, raising questions about the Regional Reuse Area's
long-term sustainability. Without treatment, the toxic element became increasingly
concentrated. A private firm contracted by the Grassland Area Farmers to monitor selenium
found that drainage used to irrigate crops in the Reuse Area between 2003 and 2005 had
selenium concentrations ranging from 43 to 761 parts per billion (ppb), well above the 32 ppb
standard associated with a high probability of reduced avian hatchability and an increased
probability of embryo deformities (H.T. Harvey & Associates 2006, 23).
Although managers actively deterred wildlife from the Reuse Area, eggs gathered along drainage
ditches in 2005 registered selenium levels as high or higher than those recorded in Kesterson in
the 1980s (Boxall 2006; Interviews G-5, G-13). The firm reported that egg-selenium
concentrations were significantly greater in the Reuse Area than in a nearby reference area, but
that even eggs in the reference area demonstrated elevated levels (see Table 5-2) (H.T. Harvey &
Associates 2006, 23).74 Experts found the elevated reference levels most disturbing because they
indicated that alternative pathways to selenium exposure could exist and efforts to prevent
harmful wildlife exposures were failing (Interview G-13). The firm also reported that egg-
selenium concentrations were significantly higher in 2005 than in 2004 (P<0.05) (H.T. Harvey &
Associates 2006, 17). Table 5-3 demonstrates that higher proportions of eggs collected in the
Reuse Area had an increased probability of impaired reproduction (H.T. Harvey & Associates
2006, 23).
Table 5-2
COMPARISON OF EGG-SELENIUM LEVELS IN REUSE AND REFERENCE AREA
(2005)
Species Group Killdeer Recurvirostrida
Reuse Area Reference Area Reuse Area Reference Area
Mean Selenium (ppm dry wt) 15.9 5.5 35.3 12.4
Significant difference between sites Yes; t= 7.3764; P<0.000l Yes; t=6.6239; P<0.0001
Notes:
a Recurvirostrids include American Avocets and black-necked stilts.
Source: H.T. Harvey & Associates (2006), 17
74 Studies have indicated that "eggs are the best indicator for selenium transfer and toxic biological effects to avian
species" (H.T. Harvey & Associates 2006, 20).
Table 5-3
DISTRIBUTION OF EGG-SELENIUM CONCENTRATIONS
BY PROBABILITY OF REPRODUCTIVE IMPACT
(2005)
Species Group Killdeer Recurvirostrid a
Reuse Area Reference Area Reuse Area Reference Area
Background level:b 0 0 0 0
<3 ppm dry wt (0%) (0%) (0%) (0%)
Increased probability of avian reproduction 1 15 0 4
effects: (7%) (100%) (0%) (24%)
3-7.9 ppm dry wt
Increased probability of reduced hatchability: 7 0 0 10
8-18 ppm dry wt (47%) (0%) (0%) (59%)
High probability of reduced hatchability: 7 0 12 3
>18 ppm dry wt (47%) (0%) (100%) (18%)
Total 15 15 12 17
Notes:
a Recurvirostrids include American Avocets and black-necked stilts.
b Experts reported being most concerned that all eggs from the reference area exceeded background selenium
levels, indicating broad contamination in the San Joaquin Valley that could threaten wildlife reproduction
(Interview G-13).
Source: H.T. Harvey & Associates (2006), 21
The number of exposed birds was far less in the Regional Reuse Area than in Kesterson
Reservoir because the area of drains was smaller than the former Reservoir and the San Joaquin
River Water Quality Improvement Project (SJRIP) prevented selenium from reaching wetland
habitat (Interview G-8). Also notable, Panoche Drainage District prepared a Negative
Declaration for SJRIP under the California Environmental Quality Act in 2000. The Declaration
included monitoring protocols developed in conjunction with the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service
and mitigation provisions if monitoring detected negative impacts to wildlife. Under Panoche
Drainage District's lead, SJRIP complied with these provisions by making the area less attractive
to birds and avoiding drainage ponding. After reviewing the 2005 monitoring data, SJRIP
funded the creation of 50 acres of wetland habitat supplied by freshwater to mitigate any harm to
wildlife (H.T. Harvey & Associates 2006, 1, 23, 24; Boxall 2006; Interview G-3).
However, others responded that any strategy which increased wildlife exposure to selenium was
not sustainable (Interviews G- 11, G-12, G-13). Some informants also expressed concern that too
few variables were monitored; they felt that the broader ecosystem effects, including impacts on
terrestrial species, should be examined in order to fully understand and, if necessary, adapt
SJRIP (Interview G-1 1). In summary, other strategies which more actively limited selenium
leaching in the first place might have yielded greater benefits to wildlife, had fewer externalities
shouldered by federal and state funds, and thus have been more cost-effective. If the regulation's
objective was to reduce selenium loads in general rather than in the San Joaquin River
specifically, the Grassland Bypass Project failed because until a viable treatment process exists,
Grassland Area Farmers only store rather than reduce selenium leaching.
In summary, dischargers in each case succeeded in meeting pollution reduction targets in the
majority of months and years even if they did not trade amongst each other. In fact, the Long
Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange, the only program which supported trading activity, had
the lowest rate of meeting its General Permit target whereas the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association,
which neither offset nor internally traded, remained well below pollution limits in all years.
Water quality results were less clear. While conditions in the Pamlico River and Long Island
Sound showed some initial improvements, it is not possible to attribute these changes to specific
programs. In contrast, preliminary water quality results in the Grassland Area are less
promising. Despite keeping selenium discharges to the San Joaquin River below limits in most
months and years, egg-selenium data suggest that wildlife are at risk of reduced reproductive
success due to selenium exposure, and these risks are greatest in the Regional Reuse Area.
Some stakeholders in each program have concerns over long-term water quality improvements.
As long as equalized nitrogen credits remain subsidized, continued upgrades and nitrogen
reductions depend on the availability of the Clean Water Fund. A few stakeholders in North
Carolina question whether the nutrient reduction target is sufficient and if nonpoint sources will
achieve mandated nutrient reductions to restore the estuary. Finally, monitoring data in the
Grassland Area suggest that current management strategies are failing to protect wildlife from
harmful selenium exposure. Despite an apparent disconnect between pollution reduction and
trading activity, lingering concerns over management strategies, and inconclusive evidence on
whether water quality is improving due to market-based instruments, I now consider what
unexpected outcomes emerged that could indirectly benefit water quality.
Indirect Outcomes: Accepting Regulations and Improving Watershed Management
I argue that the contributions of market-based instruments to pollution reduction are not limited
to whether trades redistribute abatement efforts to maximize cost-effectiveness. I now discuss
the indirect benefits of these programs that were most consistent across cases, including
increasing sources' willingness to accept more stringent regulations; facilitating the collection,
sharing, and use of information; and increasing capacity to manage resources along hydrologic
boundaries. This section compares how each trading program facilitated regulations; changed
dynamics among dischargers, agencies, and environmental groups; and altered the transfer and
value of information and the means to implement strategies on a watershed scale - all of which
could indirectly contribute to water quality improvement.
Increased Willingness to Comply with Pollution Regulations
As Chapter 1 explains, one obstacle to continued water quality improvements under the Clean
Water Act has been point sources' resistance to more stringent water quality-based regulations
and difficulties engaging nonpoint sources in pollution reduction efforts. Therefore, it is a
significant finding that each case involved dischargers accepting a more stringent and
unprecedented regulation. In North Carolina and Connecticut, point sources were accustomed to
effluent limits within NPDES permits, but nutrients specifically had not been controlled.7 s The
California case represented an even greater change; although authority existed under state law,
Regional Water Quality Control Boards had not previously issued waste discharge requirements
75 The group cap on nutrient discharges from Tar-Pamlico Basin Association members is an agreement rather than a
formal state regulation (Interview T-3).
for nonpoint sources.7 6 The Use Agreement conditions imposed by U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
and the Phase I and Phase II waste discharge requirements issued by the Central Valley Regional
Water Quality Control Board in 1997 and 2001 were the first load limits on agricultural sources
in California (Austin 2001, 341; InterviewG-6).
Why did dischargers in each case accept these new controls? In the Grassland Area, districts
formed a regional entity and agreed to reductions to secure access to the San Luis Drain and
sustain agriculture (Interviews G-1, G-2, G-4, G-10). In all cases there was also a realization of
impending regulations. 77 Each watershed had a well-publicized problem creating a sense of
crisis, and agencies had both the authority and will to act. Sources familiar with the Long Island
Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange noted that sewage treatment plants were also willing to accept
nutrient limits in part because the Long Island Sound Study and Comprehensive Conservation
and Management Plan built consensus around the need to address hypoxia; TMDL limits were
no surprise after years of deliberative study (Interviews L-1, L-3, L-5).
Recognizing impending regulations, sources faced three options: 1) comply with the individual
regulations and bear financial burdens; 2) resist, thus avoiding immediate expenditures but
risking legal and administrative fees while increasing agency costs (Tar-Pamlico and Long Island
Sound basins) or access to the San Luis Drain (Grassland Area); or 3) pursue an alternative such
as trading. Oldham and Castille (2003, 42) report that the threat of regulation plays an important
role in encouraging nonpoint sources to participate in new management strategies. 78 I argue the
inverse as well: the option to trade eased the implementation of an unprecedented regulation.
North Carolina's Division of Water Quality and Connecticut's Department of Environmental
Protection recognized that point sources would likely resist prescriptive limits, creating a lengthy
and costly process. To the extent that they did prevent dischargers from opposing and delaying
new requirements, market-based instruments allowed pollution reductions to happen faster. The
General Permit and group cap also eased the Department's and Division's administrative burden
significantly by eliminating many individual permits (Interviews T-7, L-1, L-2, L-4, L-5, L-6).79'
80
Dischargers in all cases preferred the flexibility and autonomy of a decentralized regulatory
approach that trading offered over individual, prescriptive limits, and many claimed it played a
role in dischargers' compliance with the more stringent limits. One stakeholder claimed that a
critical component of the Grassland Area Farmers' willingness to accept selenium load limits
was the assurance that agencies and environmentalists would stay out of internal activities if the
region remained below load limits at Site B; they were willing to cooperate as long as their
autonomy was respected (Interview G-12). The decentralized regulatory framework of the
Tradable Loads Program better meshed with this dynamic than prescriptive, individual permits.
76 The state had previously relied on voluntary implementation of best management practices.
77 Two stakeholders believed that the districts would have been more likely to resist the load limits were it not for
the state's authority to regulate nonpoint source pollution (Interviews G-1, G-5).
78 Oldham and Castille (2003, 42) were discussing voluntary implementation of agricultural best management
practices in the southeastern U.S.
9 One stakeholder estimated that a facility could delay a permit up to five years (Interview L-2).
8 Staff approximated that writing a nitrogen effluent limit into each NPDES permit would take staff at the two
months of uninterrupted effort (Interview L-6).
Stakeholders also recognized that trading under a group limit provided risk pooling or "safety in
numbers" that prevented smaller dischargers in particular from being unduly burdened and gave
them time to upgrade (Interviews G-1, G-4, G-12, T-1, T-3, T-5, T-6, T-7). The option to
voluntarily participate in the market mitigated risks. Dischargers in the Tar-Pamlico and Long
Island Sound basins appreciated knowing that they could simply purchase credits if nutrient
limits were not achievable. Similarly, the Grassland and Long Island Sound programs reduced
exposure to over-compliance by allowing dischargers to generate revenue if they reduced loads
more than necessary, providing an incentive to go "above and beyond" (Interviews G-4, T-1, T-
3, T-5, T-6, L-1, L-2, L-4, L-5, L-6).
Factors in addition to the option to trade also contributed to sources' acceptance of regulations
and participation in management programs. For instance, greater accountability among point
sources in Connecticut compared to North Carolina might explain why municipalities in the
Long Island Sound watershed were willing to reduce wastewater loads. Oldham and Castille
(2003) have observed that refusal to accept responsibility can impede actions to improve water
quality. Even when stakeholders agree that a watershed faces water quality problems, they will
often not accept responsibility and instead derail results by blaming others. There was far less
finger-pointing among Connecticut sources than in the Tar-Pamlico basin, probably because both
wastewater discharges and urban stormwater runoff (the two primary sources of nitrogen loads
from Connecticut to Long Island Sound) fell under municipal jurisdiction. Municipalities had to
reduce nitrogen loads either way, and increasing sewage treatment was more straightforward.
Consequently, dischargers did not resist when point sources were tasked to reduce a
disproportionate share of the nitrogen entering the watershed (Interview L-4). In contrast, Tar-
Pamlico Basin Association members emphasized that the majority of hypoxia-causing nutrients
came from agriculture, not their facilities, so they should not be the only sources to reduce loads.
In addition to easing point source acceptance of a new regulation, the Tar-Pamlico Nutrient
Offset Program attempted to engage nonpoint sources, a previously unregulated sector, by
having point sources fund the Agriculture Cost Share Program Coordinator (Interviews T-1, T-4,
T-5, T-6). This support indirectly contributed to best management practice modification so that
practices better met nutrient reduction goals (Interviews T-4, T-5, T-6).8 1 This connection was
valuable given that the majority of nutrient loads was attributable to agriculture, but at the outset
of Phase I only point sources were regulated.
Given the potential savings, autonomy, and risk reduction, both dischargers and regulators stood
to benefit from trading. As Hahn (1989, 111) suggests, the decision to adopt market-based
instruments was based on political as well as economic realities; policymakers were not just
trying to maximize cost-effectiveness. In summary, the flexibility of a regional limit with the
option to trade encouraged point sources to cooperate with the state and environmental interests;
accept more stringent, unprecedented limits; and attempt to engage previously unregulated
nonpoint sources in pollution reduction efforts.
8 Farmers are unaware of the source of Agriculture Cost Share funds that they receive in order to ease
administration and prevent competition among funding sources. Consequently, most farmers are probably unaware
of the Nutrient Offset Program (Interviews T-4, T-5).
Increased Capacity for Watershed Management
The other indirect outcomes associated with market-based instruments that could increase the
capacity for watershed management relate to changes in dynamics among stakeholders. The
trading programs made relationships between agencies and dischargers less adversarial than they
would have been under the prescriptive alternative (Interviews L-2, L-3, T-6); the flexibility and
decentralization of decisionmaking appeared to diffuse tensions. Program design also brought
diverse interests including public utilities, drainage districts, regulators, and environmentalists to
the table to discuss load management. Particularly in the San Joaquin Valley in the aftermath of
the Kesterson disaster, dischargers and environmentalists were wary of each other. When Terry
Young approached the districts with the tradable loads proposal, they initially dismissed her
ideas and agreed to test the strategy only after receiving a federal grant to fund Susan Austin,
effectively making it a free experiment (Interview G-4). However, districts came to recognize
some value in the decentralized regulatory strategy; the program made the two interests partners
in a common problem, and they both gained. Environmental Defense had the opportunity to test
a market-based instrument for water quality protection, and the Grassland Area Farmers had
another tool that could help them meet their regional limit (Interview G-4).
The development and approval of the Tradable Loads Program became a coalescing process for
the Economic Incentives Advisory Committee composed of a farmer, regulator,
environmentalist, and academic, as well as for the Grassland Area Farmers as a whole. Every
Grassland Basin Drainage Steering Committee member had to approve the program (Austin
2001, 353, 392; Interviews G-1, G-8). Dividing the regional selenium allocation among the
seven districts, monitoring, and issuing internal, performance-based penalties and rebates, all
necessary for a cap and trade system, increased accountability by dividing responsibility among
members (Austin 2001, 382-3; Interview G-12). 82 These discussions were valuable because they
forced diverse interests to establish how they would interact, define guiding principles, and
assign responsibility (Interviews G-1, G-4, G-8, G-10, G-12).
Accounts vary, but most people interviewed across cases indicated that relationships among
groups improved as a result of the negotiations and agreements had greater value and legitimacy
because they received broad buy-in (Interviews G-1, G-4, G-8, G-12, T-1, T-5, T-6). At the
same time, stakeholders readily admit that differences in viewpoints and priorities among parties
still exist (Interviews G- 11, T-7). Most notably, one stakeholder felt that the adoption of Phase
II of the Tar-Pamlico Basin nutrient strategy without environmental groups' approval
demonstrated that collaboration was not really necessary (Interview T-7). However, they also
hope that the legitimacy created by broad participation would shelter aspects of the agreement
from Legislative interference (Interviews T-6, T-7). Similarly, the Grassland Area Farmers
continue to try to garner approval from environmental groups as they pursue other regional non-
trading strategies to manage selenium (Interviews G-3, G-12). In summary, trading program
82 Opinions differ as to whether the Grassland Area Farmers would have divided the region's allocation among
districts anyway. Some feel that distribution would not have occurred without the Tradable Loads Program
(Interviews G-4, G-12), while others felt that distributing the allocation was necessary with any reduction strategy
(Interview G-1). Either way, the allocations have contributed to other aspects of selenium reduction efforts. For
instance, distribution of incentive fee and SJRIP payments rely on this allocation (Interviews G-4, G-12).
design brought diverse stakeholders together, built trust and credibility, and increased the
likelihood that these groups would work together in the future despite lingering differences.
Finally, closer relationships may have increased sources' ability to reduce pollution. Dischargers
in each case benefited from staying under a regional cap by avoiding permits or gaining access to
the San Luis Drain. Therefore, they took a collective interest in wanting each other to reduce
loads (Interviews G-1, G-3, G-4, G-8, G-10, T-1, T-3, T-6, T-7, L-1, L-2, L-3). 8 3 Developing an
interest in helping others to collectively achieve group reduction targets and better relations and
increased communication among stakeholders facilitated the sharing and use of information that
could improve watershed management. This finding is relevant given that incomplete
information poses a major challenge to watershed management. Regulators in particular often do
not fully understand pollution sources, how substances travel through and affect the
environment, and how easily these damages could be mitigated. Resource constraints limit
agencies' monitoring and modeling efforts to shed light on these questions and thus better protect
water resources. Trading can contribute to water quality improvements if it makes better use of
existing data and induces the collection and sharing of additional information by changing the
incentives facing dischargers.
In theory, pollution trading should take advantage of the fact that dischargers often have a better
understanding of how to reduce pollution than regulators. Rather than prescribing uniform
controls for each source, trading allows dischargers to leverage their knowledge and select the
most cost-effective way to meet targets (Kolstad 2000, 145; Interview G-12). These cases
demonstrate that trading also creates a demand for information. Most notably in the Tar-Pamlico
basin, the programs had the indirect benefit of increasing data and understanding by transforming
information from a liability to an asset.
The Tar-Pamlico Basin Association seized data as a means to demonstrate its good-faith efforts,
thus maintaining its right to a group cap in lieu of individual permits. Members also wanted
substantive data and analysis to prove that nonpoint sources contributed most nutrient loads and
point sources should not be responsible for the majority of reductions. The Association therefore
secured resources for the estuary model in Phase I and signed a Memorandum of Agreement in
2006 with the Division of Water Quality to start a monitoring coalition so that water quality data
could yield more useful information. The Association hoped that greater information would
improve accountability among nonpoint sources (DENR 2006c; Interviews T-1, T-4, T-5, T-7).
The estuary model was particularly important because of the scientific uncertainty surrounding
the causes of eutrophication in the Pamlico River. Unlike other trading programs such as the
Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange, a TMDL specifying a final cap on allowable loads
did not exist when the state decided to move forward with the nutrient strategy. Therefore, better
understanding and nutrient reductions were concurrent goals. Securing resources to adequately
monitor and develop TMDL analyses is a common challenge among states, and the estuary
model and monitoring coalition reduced the Division's burden and provided more information
than would otherwise exist (Interviews T-1, T-3, T-4, T-6, T-8). The Basin Association made
these contributions in part to maintain the decentralized alternative to prescriptive, individual
permits and the option to offset loads.
83 One Tar-Pamlico stakeholder believed that the Basin Association would not be as close-knit if the group cap
assigned individual allocations (Interviews T-7).
The Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange appears to have somewhat increased the
degree of information dissemination among facilities and the Department, although not as
dramatically as the Tar-Pamlico program. The desire to minimize credit purchases, generate
revenue through sales, and meet the General Permit and TMDL limits so that the Nitrogen Credit
Exchange could remain intact may have increased demand for optimization trainings and plant
modifications and prompted research on methods to further reduce nitrogen loads (Interviews L-
1, L-2, L-3, L-6). In addition, the collective interest generated by sewage treatment plants'
desire to maintain the aggregate nutrient limit and Exchange option most likely enabled the
Department to audit and standardize data reporting processes, a step which gave the state better
control and knowledge over pollution entering the watershed (Interviews L-1, L-2, L-3).
However, the role of the Exchange is hard to isolate from other outreach efforts occurring as part
of the Long Island Sound Study.
More notably, the Nitrogen Credit Exchange increased the salience of water quality issues and
support for restoring the Clean Water Fund more than its developers had envisioned. The need
for facilities that had not reduced loads to purchase credits created a tangible expense on city
budgets and gained mayors' attention. These politicians then lobbied the state to authorize more
general obligation bonds to fund facility upgrades (Interview L-4).
Another critical challenge of watershed management is that political and hydrologic boundaries
often do not align. EPA highlights that one benefit of trading is its ability to facilitate
communication among discharges within a watershed. All three cases took this benefit a step
further by creating institutions organized along basins. It is difficult to separate the role of
trading from other factors contributing to the formation of the Grassland Area Farmers. The
entity was created prior to the implementation of the Tradable Loads Program so that the districts
could enter into the Use Agreement; some insisted that it would have existed even without
trading (Interview G-1). However, Young, who proposed the cap and trade system and was
involved in the Use Agreement negotiations from the start, determined over the course of her
research on economic incentives that a regional approach was necessary. She therefore insisted
that a regional entity be created and the selenium load limits be set at this level (Interview G-12).
A group of dischargers organized by watershed did not exist in North Carolina prior to the Tar-
Pamlico Basin Association. The benefits of the group cap and the option to trade under the
Nutrient Offset Program over traditional, individual effluent limits created demand for the
Association and attracted members (Interviews T-5, T-6, T-7, T-8). The Association facilitated
communication and planning among otherwise independent municipal dischargers (Interviews T-
4, T-5, T-6). Quarterly meetings became a forum for exchange; each meeting concluded with a
roundtable to share thoughts on issues not just related to nutrient management (Interviews T-5,
T-6). Finally, one stakeholder believed that the Basin Association and subsequent discharger
organizations in North Carolina forced the state to look at basinwide approaches (Interview T-7).
In summary, dischargers were drawn to both the Basin Association and the Grasslands Area
Farmers because of the ability to trade, avoid individual permits and, in the Grasslands' case,
gain access to the drain. These groups then increased understanding and facilitated further
regional initiatives because of the communication they initiated on a watershed scale (Interviews
T-5, G-1, G-4, G-8, G-10, G-12).
In summary, the appeal of trading as a more flexible, decentralized alternative to prescriptive
limits increased dischargers' willingness to accept unprecedented regulations and facilitated a
collective interest in remaining within their regional limit in order to maintain trading as an
option. This common goal encouraged the formation of groups along watershed boundaries and
better use of information, both changes that could facilitate further water quality improvements
in the future. Given the uncertainty in environmental planning, these results are significant
contributions.
Ability to Adapt
Another challenge of water quality management is adapting to new or changing information. No
strategy will be perfect, leading one stakeholder to note that any program must be able to adjust
to some trial and error (Interview T-5). At the same time, flexible and fluctuating regulations
can be more costly to the regulated community because they discourage dischargers from
making long-term capital-investments (Kolstad 2000, 206). I found that the option to trade in the
Tar-Pamlico basin helped the state to attempt adaptive management by inducing point sources to
fund and provide necessary information.
The negotiations and agreements leading to the development of all three programs had definite
phases that provided an opportunity for re-evaluation: the Grassland Bypass Project's Use
Agreement with U.S. Bureau of Reclamation and state waste discharge requirement permits;
Long Island Sound's General Permit and TMDL with a mandated five-year review;84 and the
phases of the Tar-Pamlico nutrient strategy. Although some improvement in the estuary was
apparent, the Division of Water Quality committed to develop a new TMIDL if studies for the
2014 Basin Plan identify any remaining impairment in the Pamlico River (DENR 1994;
Interview T-3, T-5, T-6, T-8)." Each program also required monitoring data that were analyzed
annually.
The finite phases and range of signatories provided Tar-Pamlico, Grassland Area, and Long
Island Sound stakeholders with a regular opportunity to evaluate new and emerging issues,
uncertainty, and the tradeoffs between adaptability and consistency. The proposal to have a
group cap and trading option was one of the primary reasons that North Carolina adopted the
negotiated and phased approach to Tar-Pamlico basin's nutrient strategy development. Parties
could opt not to participate, such as Environmental Defense's and Pamlico-Tar River
8 Both Phase III of the Long Island Sound Study and the TMDL specified that the TMDL would be revisited every
five years to ensure that the plan is reducing hypoxia (CTDEP and NYSDEC 2000, 8; EPA 1998 22). Any revisions
to the TMDL would trigger adjustments to the General Permit to ensure that the reduction schedule remained
consistent with the interim and final wasteload allocation. Although the General Permit has been revised,
Connecticut and New York have not revisited the TMDL since its initial passage. The Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection recognizes that it is necessary, particularly given new information suggesting equivalency
factors in one of the basins must be revised (Interviews L-2). However, such revisions would expend agency staff
effort, particularly because of the requisite public hearings that must accompany any changes in the TMDL or
General Permit (Interviews L-2, L-6).
85 Some stakeholders voiced concern that the Division will not expend the resources to develop a TMDL for the
estuary since it backed away from developing a fate and transport model for the basin at the end of Phase II. The
Division's response is that many far less studied watersheds exist in North Carolina, so it cannot spend resources on
watersheds that already have nutrient strategies with demonstrated progress (Interviews T-1, T-3, T-5, T-8).
Foundation's decision to abstain from Phase II given concerns over nutrient reduction targets and
insufficient nonpoint source requirements. Phase H continued without them; only the state had
veto power over an unfavorable agreement (Interviews T-6). The environmental groups returned
to the table for Phase III because they felt that they could better influence the process as
participants rather than commenters (Interview T-5). Signatories reported better understanding
and respect for other parties' viewpoints even if they did disagree (Interviews T-5, T-6).
Phase III negotiations in 2007 provided the opportunity to revisit the Nutrient Offset Program's
unsettled details. Many agree that maintaining loads below limits will be increasingly difficult
as population increases, and the Basin Association may need to offset a portion of its loads in the
future (Interviews T-1, T-3, T-6, T-7, T-8). Therefore, addressing differences over offset rates,
actions, and credit lives is important in 2007 before offsets become critical to the point sources'
compliance strategy (Interviews T-1, T-5, T-8).86
Evaluating progress requires data, and one stakeholder noted that insufficient monitoring to
capture constantly changing information is the greatest challenge of adaptive management;
models only provide static estimations of current conditions (Interview T-8). In exchange for the
granting point sources greater flexibility by allowing a group cap and offset option and in an
attempt to prove that nonpoint sources account for the majority of nutrient loads, the Basin
Association willingly filled some of these knowledge gaps that the Division noted were the
greatest obstacles to nutrient strategy development (Interviews T-1, T-4, T-5, T-6). This data
collection and analysis has augmented the state's basinwide planning process.
In summary, scheduled permit renewals, often with opportunities for public comment, are
common in water quality management. However, these programs appeared to go a step further.
Broader stakeholder interests were actively involved in program formation and evaluation as
well. Of course, greater attention and review are not surprising given the salience of the water
quality problems in each watershed. The Tar-Pamlico case demonstrates the clearest connection
between a market-based instrument and adaptability; the existence of the trading option can
leverage additional information necessary for any type of adaptive management.
Summary
Dischargers in the Grassland Area, Tar-Pamlico, and Long Island Sound basins have
demonstrated pollution reductions that have met objectives in most years. In addition, initial
evaluations suggest water quality is improving in the Pamlico and Long Island estuaries.
Participation in the Nitrogen Credit Exchange suggests that plants have hastened and prioritized
nitrogen removal where it is most beneficial, but the direct role of trading in the other two cases
is limited. The cases also demonstrate that trading activity is not synonymous with pollution
reduction; Connecticut sewage treatment plants have the lowest rate of meeting state pollution
reduction targets. Even without active trading, market-based instruments made unexpected
86 The environmental groups and the Division would like to see at least a portion of nitrogen credits fund stormwater
retrofits, the nonpoint source with the greatest unaddressed need. Consequently, the offset rate should be adjusted
accordingly (Interviews T-1, T-8). In the absence of rigorous or frequent auditing programs, environmental groups
would also prefer the implementation of best management practices with minimal maintenance requirements to
increase the certainty that nutrient reductions actually occur (Interviews T-5, T-8).
contributions that could indirectly improve environmental outcomes. In all three cases, trading
facilitated the adoption of new and more stringent regulations and improved use of information
and communication among dischargers, regulators, and environmental groups on a watershed
scale.
On the other hand, the documented impacts of selenium on wildlife in the Grassland Area's
Regional Reuse Area also reveal the disadvantage of foregoing the control of prescriptive,
command and control management strategies. Harmful as well as beneficial unintended
outcomes become more likely. This tradeoff is especially risky for toxic substances like
selenium. Although trading was not the primary driver of the San Joaquin River Water Quality
Improvement Project, concerns over the long-term feasibility and safety of the Reuse Area
highlight the need to reframe questions and adjust strategies as new information or conditions
emerge. Increased communication and information sharing, most notably demonstrated in the
Tar-Pamlico basin, indicate that market-based incentives can encourage behavior that supports
review and adaptation.
CHAPTER 6: LESSONS FOR OTHER WATERSHEDS
Since the Clean Water Act's passage in 1972, the issuance of technology-based limits on point
sources has removed much pollution from U.S. waterways. In water quality-limited areas that
remain impaired even after point sources complied with technology standards, some states have
developed Total Maximum Daily Load (TMDL) analyses to determine how much pollution
water bodies can assimilate while still meeting quality-based standards and apportioned these
loads among sources, encouraging pollution management on a watershed scale. Despite these
efforts, states and the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) have not achieved the Clean
Water Act's goal of restoring all waters to fishable and swimmable conditions. The majority of
water bodies are not even monitored for chemical, physical, and biological parameters, and 40 to
50 percent of rivers, streams, and lakes that are monitored failed to meet standards supporting
their designated uses as of 2003 (EPA 2003b, 2004, 1). Given the limited resources available to
fund pollution reductions and the success of some market-based instruments in addressing other
environmental problems such as sulfur dioxide, many economists, states, dischargers, and non-
governmental organizations have proposed trading as a means to increase the cost-effectiveness
of reduction efforts and thus achieve greater water quality improvements.
To determine whether trading achieved these expected benefits, I analyzed three market-based
instruments: the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program in California's San Joaquin
Valley; the Tar-Pamlico River Basin Nutrient Offset Program in North Carolina; and the Long
Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange in Connecticut (see Table 6-1).87 Each program was just
one component of broader strategies to improve water quality. Despite cases' unique context,
similarities yield lessons on the feasibility and utility of market-based instruments as regulatory
tools to improve water resources. In this final chapter, I discuss how policymakers and
environmental advocates could apply findings from these cases to other watersheds in need of
pollution reductions to meet water quality standards.
87 I refer to all of these programs under the broad term of water quality trading because they involve some type of
agreement in which one discharger agrees to pollute less so that another can pollute more.
Table 6-1
SUMMARY CHARACTERISTICS OF TRADING PROGRAMS
Grassland Area Tar-Pamlico River Basin Long Island Sound
Farmers Tradable Nutrient Offset Program Nitrogen Credit Exchange
Loads Program
Pollutant Selenium (acute) Nitrogen and Phosphorous Nitrogen (chronic)
(chronic)
Regulatory Driver San Luis Drain Use Nutrient Sensitive Waters Long Island Sound TMDL
Agreement a Designation
Design Cap and Trade External: Offset; b Credit Exchange
Internal: Potential Cap and Trade c
Buyer 7 Drainage Districts External: 1 TPBA i (pS e) 79 sewage treatment plants
(NPS d) Internal: 15 TPBA members (PS*) (PS*)
Seller 7 Drainage Districts External: Farmers (NPS d); 79 sewage treatment plants
d (p ) C)(NPS ) Internal: 15 TPBA members (PS (PS
Clearinghouse No External: Yes; Internal: No Yes
Reduction Quantity High External: Medium; Internal: High Medium
Certainty g Price Low External: High; Internal: Low Medium
Market Activity None - Some in past External and Internal: No - Expect Active
in future
Notes:
a The Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board has since issued a waste discharge requirement to
the Grassland Area Farmers; the Use Agreement and waste discharge requirement limits are identical.
b The Tar-Pamlico Basin Association retains the ability to purchase offset credits if nitrogen discharges exceed
the group cap. These offsets fund nitrogen reductions from agricultural land in the basin.
c The Tar-Pamlico Basin Association may meet its group cap however it chooses. Although outside sources
have posited that an internal cap and trade exists and members have discussed the possibility, members report
that they have not established such a system to date.
d Nonpoint source
* Point source
f Tar-Pamlico Basin Association
g High quantity certainty means that the total amount of pollution discharged is definite; low certainty means
that total discharges may vary or exceed the cap. High price certainty means that definite limits on how much
regulated entities will pay to comply exist, whereas low certainty means that abatement costs are largely
unknown.
h The level of certainty regarding nitrogen discharges ranges from low to high, depending on whether it is
assumed that agricultural best management practices are implemented on schedule and achieve their estimated
reductions.
Findings Across Cases
Table 6-2 shows that dischargers in each program met their pollution reduction targets in most
years. However, the means by which they achieved these goals varied significantly. Some
Connecticut sewage treatment plants used the state Clean Water Fund to upgrade plants and sold
credits on the Nitrogen Credit Exchange; others purchased credits in order to comply with the
General Permit. All participated in the Exchange. In contrast, Tar-Pamlico Basin Association
(the Basin Association) members met their group cap by optimizing plant operations and
agreeing to implement nitrogen removal when performing other upgrades; they did not seek
compensation for these actions. Finally, the Grassland Area Farmers abandoned trading in favor
of storing selenium in the government-subsidized Regional Reuse Area.
Table 6-2
OUTCOMES OF WATER QUALITY TRADING PROGRAMS
Grassland Area Farmers Tar-Pamlico River Basin Long Island Sound Nitrogen
Tradable Loads Program Nutrient Offset Program Credit Exchange
Changes in Water Quality
General Permit: Yes - 60% ofAchieved Pollution Yes - 80% of years, 84% of Yes - 100% of years years; TMDL: Yes - 100% of
Reduction Goals months years
Improved Water No - Less selenium in river, Yes - N and P down; less Yes - N down; DO up
Quality b but increasing egg-selenium ipie sur e on Ou
concentrations
Primary Means to Selenium storage in Regional Onsite optimization; nutrient Participate in Nitrogen Credit
Reduce Pollution Reuse Area removal when other upgrades Exchange
Wildlife exposure to Adequacy of nitrogen cap; need Future availability of Clean
Remaining Concerns selenium in Reuse Area to reduce urban and rural runoff Water Fund
Intended Outcomes
Increased Cost- No - Offsets and internal Yes - Reduction efforts
EffectivenessNo - Trading not used trading not used redistributed through Exchange*
Unintended Outcomes"
Willingness to Yes Yes Yes
Accept Regulation
Immediate Benefit Flexibility in meeting Use Avoided individual effluent Avoided individual effluent
Agreement limits limits limits
Improved Relations Most agree yes Most agree yes Most agree yes
among Stakeholders
Created Institution Yes - General Permit includes
Consistent with Yes - Grassland Area Yes - Tar-Pamlico Basin equivalency factor zones; whole
Watershed Farmers Association state within watershed
Boundaries
Promoted . Yes - Basin Association Somewhat - May have increased
Information Yes - Increased monitonng; funded estuary model, gage, interest in trainings and
Collection, Sharing, share strategies to reduce Cost Share Coordinator, and encouraged standardized
and Use selenium, protect wildlife monitoring coalition monitoring and analysis
Notes:
a External trading refers to the Nutrient Offset Program, whereas internal trading refers to the Tar-Pamlico Basin
Association's option to create an internal cap and trade system, although it has not to date.
b Trading programs were all part of broader pollution reduction strategies, so changes in water quality and unintended
outcomes are not only the result of dischargers' option to trade.
b Some stakeholders disagree over whether the Clean Water Fund and Nitrogen Credit Exchange actually prioritized
upgrades at facilities where they would be most cost-effective.
Water quality outcomes also varied across cases and are not attributable exclusively to the
market-based tools. Preliminary analysis suggests that Long Island and Pamlico sounds are
improving, although some uncertainty remains. In contrast, egg-selenium concentrations
indicate that wildlife is exposed to the toxic element and at risk of reduced reproductive success.
While much of the literature focuses on the ability of market-based instruments to maximize
cost-effectiveness, only dischargers in Connecticut utilized trading to reallocate pollution
reduction. These exchanges may not have induced the most cost-effective upgrades. Rather, the
most consistent contribution of trading programs to better water quality management was
increasing dischargers' willingness to accept more stringent and unprecedented regulations in all
three cases. In addition, and most notably in the Tar-Pamlico basin, the option to trade increased
the capacity for watershed management by encouraging institutions to form along watershed
boundaries, involving diverse stakeholders in management decisions, and inducing dischargers to
collect and share information with each other, regulators, and environmental organizations.
Lessons for Other Watersheds
What lessons from these three cases can be applied to other areas developing pollution
management strategies? How can policymakers know if a market-based instrument is an
appropriate management tool and what benefits they might expect from trading? Compared to
open, private sector markets or trading among other types of pollution, market-based instruments
face many challenges when applied to water quality such as market thinness, lack of information,
and impact of discharge location on ambient water quality. Table 6-3 displays the major
obstacles to trading in the Tar-Pamlico and Grassland Area basins.
Table 6-3
MAJOR OBSERVED OBSTACLES TO WATER QUALITY TRADING
Grassland Area Farmers Tar-Pamlico River Basin Long Island Sound
Tradable Loads Program Nutrient Offset Programa Nitrogen Credit Exchange
High - Government funded Medium - Government funds Medium - Equalized credit
Level 90-97 percent of Regional for Agriculture Cost Share value based on Clean Water
Market Reuse Area Program created offset backlog Fund projects
Distortion Deters - Subsidizes External: Deters - Creates Encourages - But if Clean
Effect alternative strategy uncertainty over reductions Water Fund insufficient,
credit effectiveness loads exceed General
Permit limit
Questionable Medium - 1) Debates over Low - Due to state
Level legitimate credit use; and 2) administration
overestimate of onsite
Uncertainty compliance costs
Minor External: Deters - Impedes Encourages - Creates
Effect planning around future trades; stability and credibility
makes onsite treatment
relatively more certain
Political Level High High Low
Transaction Deters - Districts do not Internal: Deters - Plants do not Encourages - Removes
Costs Effect want to pay each other want to pay each other plants' need to pay each
other
Even if dischargers never trade, policymakers should still consider allowing a group cap when
sources are likely to oppose individual limits if it is possible to accurately measure total pollution
loads. Given dischargers' ability to delay and resist, it is very difficult for agencies to control
pollution without some level of trust and willingness with the regulated community. This thesis
suggests that trading can help policymakers achieve a balance between regulation and flexibility
while increasing control over water quality. Of course, factors other than the ability to trade also
contributed to these dischargers' acceptance of regulations, most notably the salience of each
water quality problem. Increasing the visibility of water quality problems is an effective way to
get regulation on the policy agenda. Nevertheless, the consistent willingness to comply among
dischargers is notable given the ongoing challenges of mandating pollution reductions.
Note: External trading refers to the Nutrient Offset Program, whereas internal trading refers to Tar-Pamlico
Basin Association's option to create an internal cap and trade system, which it has not to date.
Policymakers should use dischargers' preference for trading to leverage cooperation on other
aspects of watershed management such as forming basin organizations, collecting and
disseminating information, and collaborating with diverse stakeholders. For example, the
dischargers in the cases that I studied did not want to lose the major benefit that compliance
offered, including access to the San Luis Drain and avoided individual effluent limits requiring
immediate, costly upgrades. As a result, they willingly communicated methods to decrease
discharges. Information became valuable because it allowed the group as a whole to stay below
its load limit, prove its success, and thus maintain the decentralized autonomy and flexibility
afforded by the trading program.8 8
This ability of trading to induce behavior that could increase capacity for watershed
management derives largely from its decentralized regulatory structure, not just the economic
incentives that trading specifically offers. Therefore, policymakers should remain open to other
decentralized models that could achieve similar outcomes instead of expending time and
resources only to develop pollution markets. A decentralized regulatory approach does not
mean weakening federal and state standards, however; the three cases demonstrate that trading
only works with a strong regulatory driver.
When considering whether to develop a trading program, policymakers should also note the
types of dischargers most suited to market-based instruments. Trading works best among
sources that are sensitive to price signals and have a clear incentive to minimize overall costs.
These signals are typically weaker or skewed among quasi-public or highly subsidized
industries (Kolstad 2000, 150). Furthermore, policymakers must recognize political transaction
costs, or the costs that trades impose on relationships between entities, that market-based
instruments might impose on sources which do not traditionally compete and would hesitate to
be perceived as profiting from one another. The transaction cost illustrates that dischargers are
not driven by economic rationale alone. These entities might still benefit from the increased
flexibility of a decentralized regulatory approach, but solutions are more likely to involve
regional cooperation than minimizing individual financial costs.
Alternatively, policymakers can learn from Connecticut's ability to neutralize transaction costs
by appointing a representative board to set credit values and passing money through a state-
administered exchange. Having the state as a middleman eased concerns that some entities
might take advantage of or overly depend on others. State involvement can also reduce
transaction costs associated with uncertainty and market thinness by guaranteeing a buyer and
seller, setting prices to guard against volatility, and legitimizing credits as a compliance
mechanism. Although a less free-market approach, state intervention allowed facilities to
participate in the Exchange for little cost and incorporate trading into their long-term planning
process. In contrast, the Tar-Pamlico case demonstrates that lingering uncertainty can induce
dischargers to pursue alternative, more reliable, but potentially less cost-effective solutions.
Whether or not trading is the primary strategy, policies should frame objectives carefully and
institutionalize ways to evaluate progress, incorporate new information, and adapt as necessary
88 In addition to proving that it was below the group cap, the Tar-Pamlico Basin Association also wanted to provide
evidence that point source pollution did not cause eutrophication. Consequently, it funded an estuary model, water
quality gage, Agriculture Cost Share Coordinator, and monitoring coalition to redistribute the burden to reduce back
on to those responsible for the majority of pollution: agriculture.
to address uncertainty and guard against unintended consequences. As the Tar-Pamlico Basin
Nutrient Offset Program in particular demonstrated, trading can facilitate this adaptive
management process by bringing diverse stakeholders to the table, increasing the value of
information, generating levels of cooperation among stakeholders, and creating discharger
associations that align with watershed boundaries. Environmental organizations can use their
place at the table to influence this adaptive process. They fulfill a role by continuing to review
results and raise concerns.
States must also be prepared to maintain their political will and support for water quality
improvements regardless of what watershed management strategy they adopt. Agencies and
legislatures need to commit resources to fund facility upgrades such as continued investment in
Connecticut's Clean Water Fund if the Nitrogen Credit Exchange is to induce plants to upgrade
and comply with General Permit and TMDL nitrogen limits. Similarly, government entities
must commit to monitoring and modeling efforts that highlight necessary changes and enforce
management strategies. Otherwise, unintended consequences of more flexible regional
solutions such as wildlife exposure to selenium through the Regional Reuse Area might proceed
unchecked. Similarly, the North Carolina Division of Water Quality cannot determine whether
a 30 percent nutrient reduction is sufficient to restore the Pamlico River without ongoing
monitoring. The Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit Exchange demonstrates that trading can
increase support for state and federal funding by making pollution a financial cost as well as an
environmental concern. Nevertheless, ultimate results depend on government commitment and
the public's willingness to devote taxes or rates to these problems. Again, environmental
organizations can help strengthen political will and investment in solutions by maintaining the
salience and public awareness of water quality problems.
Conclusions
Did water quality trading perform in practice as it promised in theory? Market-based
instruments only facilitated cost-effective pollution reduction when programs were carefully
designed to be credible, reliable, and minimize transaction costs among dischargers that might
not be accustomed to exchanging with one another. The Long Island Sound Nitrogen Credit
Exchange demonstrates that when these conditions are met, trading can become one useful
component of broader watershed management strategies. Just as notable, however, the
Connecticut program did not meet its General Permit discharge limits in two out of five years. It
is impossible to compare Connecticut's results to the counter-factual scenario of discharge levels
without the Exchange, but this finding demonstrates that designing policies to promote trading
alone will not always achieve pollution reduction objectives. It is necessary to decouple trading
from water quality improvements, and agencies and environmental organizations must maintain
the political and financial will to support source control efforts, enforcement, and regular
evaluation of objectives and strategies.
What were the major contributions of market-based instruments? Despite no trades in the
majority of cases, these programs had other unexpected outcomes that could enable further water
quality improvements. Because of their appeal as a flexible, decentralized alternative to
prescriptive regulations, the market-based instruments enabled increased regulation, transfer and
use of information, and formation of organizations along watershed boundaries. Given the
existing barriers to continued water quality improvement under the Clean Water Act, these
findings are significant.
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APPENDIX 1: INTERVIEWS AND INTERVIEW PROTOCOL
Name Office
Iliana Ayala Bureau of Water Protection and Land Reuse, CT Department of Environmental
Protection
Sonja Biorn-Hansen Oregon Department of Environmental Quality
Paul Blount Rocky Mount Water Resources and Member, Tar-Pamlico Basin Association
Kate Bowditch Charles River Watershed Association
Francoise Brasier U.S. EPA Office of Wetlands, Oceans, and Watersheds
Gail Cismowski Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board
Steve Coffey Division of Soil and Water Conservation, NC Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
David Cory Des Jardins Ranch and Camp 13 Representative
Melville Peter Cot6, Jr. U.S. EPA Ocean and Coastal Protection Unit
Debra Denton Central Valley Regional Liaison, U.S. EPA Monitoring and Assessment Office
Chris Eacock U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, South-Central California Area Office
Atomic Falaschi Panoche Drainage District
Manny Furtado Branford Water Pollution Control Department
Rich Gannon Division of Water Quality, NC Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Mike Gardner Grasslands Area Farmers
Marcos Hedrick Panoche District
Bryan Horsburgh U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
John Huisman Division of Water Quality, North Carolina Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
Heather Jacobs Riverkeeper, Pamlico-Tar River Foundation
Gary Johnson Bureau of Water Protection and Land Reuse, CT Department of Environmental
Protection
Joe Karkoski Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board
Kavya Kasturi U.S. EPA Office of Wastewater Management
Virginia Kibler U.S. EPA Office of Water, Headquarters
Barrett Lasater Greenville Utilities and President, Tar-Pamlico Basin Association
Chris Lewicki U.S. EPA Office of Water, Headquarters
Professor Lynn Maguire Duke University Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences
Laurie Mann U.S. EPA Region 10, Watershed Restoration Unit
Matthew McCarthy Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board
Joseph McGahan Grasslands Area Drainage Coordinator, Summers Engineering
Eugenia McNaughton EPA Region 9 Quality Assurance Office
Robert Moore Hartford Metropolitan District
Dan Nelson San Luis and Delta-Mendota Water Authority
Doug Norton U.S. EPA Office of Water, Headquarters
Theresa Presser USGS Water Resources Division
Douglas Rader Environmental Defense
Diane Rathmann General Counsel for San Luis Delta-Mendota Water Authority
Carol Lee Rawn Conservation Law Foundation
Bob Rose U.S. EPA Office of Water, Headquarters
Joseph Rudek Environmental Defense
Claire Schary U.S. EPA Region 10, Watershed Restoration Unit
Rudy Schnagl Central Valley Regional Water Quality Control Board
Alison Simcox U.S. EPA Region 1
Mark Tedesco U.S. EPA Long Island Sound Office
Mike Templeton Division of Water Quality, NC Department of Environment and Natural Resources
Steve Winnett U.S. EPA Region 1
Terry Young Consultant
I conducted interviews in person and over the phone between November 2006 and March 2007. I
used a semi-structured protocol and sent individuals whom I interviewed in person my questions
prior to our meeting. In addition, I sent my notes to the people whom I spoke with so that they
had the opportunity to retain a copy and edit, add, or remove any portions of the interview.
I promised individuals that I would not quote or attribute any material to them directly.
Therefore, I assign each interview a unique code known only to myself when referencing these
interviews. This approach protects the confidence of those whom I spoke with while providing a
sense of the number of people who stated the findings presented in this thesis.
